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BAD ROLE MODELS? 
AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON ISRAELI CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 
By Hadar Aviram* 
ABSTRACT 
In this Article I rely on the public policy concept of "policy transfer" to 
examine the impact of U.S. legislation, litigation, and politics on the Israeli 
criminal justice landscape.  The Article identifies four eras: 1. The Great Light 
from the West - the ascent of U.S. criminal justice as British influence fades; 
2. The Decade of Rights - a misperception of America as a paragon of criminal 
justice rights and protections that results in influences on Israeli 
jurisprudence; 3. The Law-and-Order Enchantment Period - a time at which 
Israeli scholars and policymakers import punitive trends from the U.S., 
particularly in the area of innovation in policing and victims’ rights; and 4. 
The Era of Contention - a time at which Israeli scholars and policymakers 
bring with them critical perspectives on the U.S. and Israeli policy begins to 
question, and deviate from, its American counterpart. I conclude that 
changing patterns of elite networking can explain why Israel, initially in 
thrall to what it perceived as a paragon of civil rights, eventually parted ways 
with the U.S. as a source of influence: the emergence of a class of academics, 
public defenders, and policymakers educated in the U.S. and conversant in 
American criminological literature critical of the punitive turn and mass 
incarceration brought about informed critiques of the American model and led 
to a "sobering up" of the Israeli policymaking world. The Article proceeds to 
explain the relationship between the two countries through the framework of 
American Political Development. Following Malcolm Feeley's analysis, the 
Article finds that both countries – self-defining as "developed" – actually 
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exhibit features of developing countries in the context of criminal justice: high 
levels of interpersonal violence and intolerance, a constant problem of police 
overreach, a legacy of racism and exclusion, high availability of weapons, and 
political corruption. This might explain Israel's fascination with American 
criminal justice not as an inspiration, but as cultural recognition of the 
similarities between the countries. 
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Gangs of savages in the streets, 
their eyes gazing and stupid. 
Their father watches TV and screams, 
“Kill everyone!” 
America is near. 
Our eyes are glued to the sun 
Because that is where our great hope comes from 
After the next war, 
The next war.1 
The issue is not whether we draw lessons from 
experience, but whether we do so well or badly.2 
INTRODUCTION 
After almost five decades of soaring incarceration rates, in 
2014, the National Research Council’s Committee on Causes and 
Consequences of High Rates of Incarceration issued a comprehensive 
report on mass incarceration in the United States.3 The report identifies 
the usual culprits: aggressive law enforcement and prosecution 
policies, private interests and investments in the criminal justice 
system, the escalation of the war on drugs and its racial undertones, 
and urban economic distress. The report also stresses the traumatic 
physical, economic, and psychological consequences of mass 
incarceration, for inmates and for their families. 
A year later, in August 2015, the Committee’s Israeli 
counterpart--the Public Committee for Examining Sentencing Policy 
and the Treatment of Offenders, chaired by retired Israel Supreme 
Court Judge Dalia Dorner published its own report.4 The report 
stressed the harms of incarceration and the need to find non-custodial 
 
1 Eifo HaYeled, “America Krovah” (America Is Near) (1993). 
2 Richard Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time 
and Place (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers 1993). 
3 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON LAW AND JUSTICE, Division of 
Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, The Growth of Incarceration in the 
United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences, available at https://www.nap.
edu/read/18613/chapter/1. 
4 The Public Committee Examining the Punishment and Treatment of Offenders, 
Report to the Minister of Justice, available at http://www.justice.gov.il/Units/
SanegoriaZiborit/News/Documents/dorner%20report.pdf. 
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alternatives. Surprisingly, the Dorner Committee’s report decries 
problems in Israel which closely echo the causes of incarceration 
identified by the American committee: an increased reliance on law 
enforcement, disproportionate policing and prosecution of people 
from disadvantaged backgrounds and communities, a growth in fear 
of crime, difficult dilemmas involving the victim’s role in the criminal 
process, and the creep of the market into the punishment field. 
How, and why, had Israel come to walk in the United States’ 
criminal justice footsteps, and how did it come to recant that at an era 
many American scholars characterize as “late mass incarceration”?5 To 
what extent are these similar conclusions about the perverseness of 
mass incarceration the consequence of similar criminal justice policies? 
And if they are, how did Israel, a state whose independence from the 
British Mandate was characterized by a strong dominance of 
European-inspired welfare socialism,6 come to look to the United 
States, a larger, more fragmented, and much more market-based state, 
for criminal justice inspiration? 
This article examines a number of crucial actions affecting 
criminal justice law and policies in Israel from the early 1980s to the 
late 2010s, tracing the ebb and flow of American (and other) influences. 
My point of departure is the robust body of public policy literature on 
the concept of transnational “policy transfer.” Colin Bennett identifies 
four modes of policy transfer,7 ranging from the least to the most 
coercive. Emulation, or as Richard Rose refers to it, “lesson drawing,”8 
involves the voluntary and deliberate reliance on another country’s 
policy experience to create a domestic version of it. Elite-networking 
involves policy transfers through transnational groups of actors 
sharing expertise and information about a common problem, often 
outside the realm of formal domestic politics, and in the context of an 
evolving international policy culture. Harmonization refers to 
 
5 For one representative example, see Christopher Seeds, Bifurcation Nation: 
American Penal Policy in Late Mass Incarceration, 19 SOCIAL JUSTICE 590 (2016). 
6 Ben-Zion Zilberfarb, From Socialism to Free Market – The Israeli Economy, 1948–
2003, 11 ISRAEL AFFAIRS 12 (2006). 
7 Colin J. Bennett, What is policy convergence and what causes it, 21 BRITISH J. OF 
POL. SCI. 215 (1991). 
8 Richard Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time 
and Place (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers 1993). 
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formally adopted policy changes deliberately structured to globalize 
approaches for common problems through the work of 
intergovernmental organizations and structures. Finally, penetration 
is a coercive form of policy transfer, in which nation states have to 
comply with policy directives from other nations or from transnational 
organizations. 
Relying on Bennett’s framework, Trevor Jones and Tim 
Newburn9 find that some criminal justice trends in the United 
Kingdom, such as privatized corrections, zero tolerance policing, and 
‘two’ and ‘three strikes sentencing’, evince considerable U.S. influence, 
and are the consequence of emulation and, to some extent, elite 
networking. Jones and Newburn remind us that policy transfer can 
involve various aspects of policy, including goals, structure and 
content; policy instruments and administrative techniques; 
institutions; ideology; ideas, attitudes and concepts; and negative as 
well as positive lessons.10 They also find that transnational influence 
can have deep and lasting impact even if it occurs through voluntary 
adoption rather than coercive means.11 
Jones and Newburn’s observations can be easily applied to 
Israel, which is particularly amenable to relying on U.S.  law. In his 
analysis of foreign law usage among domestic courts, Andrea Lollini 
identifies Israel as one of the countries that explicitly mentions 
comparative law as an authorized source for judicial decisions.12 One 
of Israel’s Supreme Court Justices has even written academically about 
the importance of foreign law, highlighting the role of U.S. Law.13 
 
9 Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, Learning from Uncle Sam? Exploring U.S. 
Influences on British Crime Control Policy, 15 GOVERNANCE 99 (2002). 
10 David Dolowitz & David Marsh, Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the 
Policy Transfer Literature, 44 POL. STUD. 343, 349-50 (1996). 
11 See Laura Nader, Human Rights and Moral Imperialism, Anthropology News, 
September 2006, at 6 (Indeed, some methods of coercion, such as imposing the 
constitution on Iraq, were not found to be effective); See generally Ugo Mattei & 
Laura Nader, Plunder: When the Rule of Law is Illegal (2008). 
12 Andrea Lollini, The South African Constitutional Court Experience: Reasoning 
Patterns Based on Foreign Law, 8 Utrecht Law Review 55 (2012); see generally 
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the 
International Impact of Rehnquist Court, 34 Tulsa L.J. 15 (1998). 
13 Eliezer Rivlin, Thoughts on Referral to Foreign Law, Global Chain-Novel, and 
Novelty, 21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009). 
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Much of the writing on global influences has focused on the 
constitutional arena, which sometimes dovetails with criminal justice 
policy. 
As I argue in this article, Israeli criminal justice policy has been 
influenced by its American counterpart in various ways, mostly 
through emulation and unique forms of elite networking. I identify 
four schemas through which Israeli criminal justice policy relates to its 
American counterpart. While there is a rough chronological logic to 
the presentation of the schemas, there are big overlaps in time, and it 
makes more sense to relate to the schemas as different strands in the 
Israeli policymaking community than as easily distinguishable 
periods. Within these schemas, it is also important to keep in mind that 
criminal justice policies and practices in Israel, as in every other 
country, are made by a variety of players in the legal field—politicians, 
government lawyers, public interest and nonprofit lawyers, prominent 
academics—and those have different ways of relating to the U.S. 
experience, which manifest in policies that latch onto different 
schemas. 
The first schema, which I refer to in Part I as The Great New 
Light from the West, identifies the early days of U.S. influence as a 
direct continuation of Israeli use of British common law. In the early 
1980s, as Israel officially severed its legal ties with its former British 
rulers, U.S. law was poised to take the place of British precedent as a 
main form of influence on Israeli law. I explain why, before the large-
scale reform of Israeli substantive criminal law, the U.S. was a natural 
source of inspiration for Israeli jurists; I then juxtapose the rise in 
prominence of U.S. law in the Israeli legal psyche with American 
isolationism and exceptionalism, establishing an obvious one-way 
path for policy transfer. 
The second schema, which I examine in Part II, is the Decade 
of Rights. The 1990s were characterized by an intriguing dichotomy 
between substantive criminal law, whose massive overhaul 1994 
evinces distinct German impression, and criminal procedure, which 
shows a clear imprint of how Israeli scholars at the time perceived U.S. 
criminal procedure. The latter changes are reflected in three important 
developments in Israel: The enactment of the Basic Law of Human 
Dignity and Freedom in 1992, the enactment of the new arrest law in 
1996, and the emergence of Israel’s Public Defender’s Office. As a 
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consequence of these moves, Israeli enthusiasm about U.S. law was 
mostly in the areas of formal due process and displays particular 
fascination with the exclusionary rule. 
The third schema, which I examine in Part III, is the Heyday of 
Law and Order. During this era, between the late 1990s and the mid-
2000s, Israeli legislators, policymakers, and academics seem to 
perceive U.S. criminal justice as it is: a punitive law and order system 
emphasizing aggressive law enforcement against street crime and a 
clear effort to prioritize victim rights and advocacy. Israeli 
developments along these lines are decidedly American, though they 
stop shy of some of the worst developments in the United States (such 
as opening sex offender registration to public viewing). 
Finally, the fourth schema, portrayed in Part IV, is the Era of 
Contention. From the mid-2000s onward, Israeli policymaking in 
criminal justice reflects a sophisticated conversation about the 
appropriateness of using the United States as a source of inspiration. 
The growing awareness of mass incarceration and its discontents, the 
impact of the financial crisis, the Obama era of reform, and the 
increasing dominance of U.S.-educated criminal justice scholars in the 
policy arena led to disillusionment with the U.S. among many 
influential players in the Israeli policymaking field. This period is 
characterized by a rejection of prison privatization, successful 
litigation against prison overcrowding, and the search for new 
inspiration in other countries, such as the Swedish model of 
addressing sex work. 
Part V discusses these developments in light of the policy 
literature. First, I observe that, in the first and second schemas, the 
emulation was limited for the most part to “law in the books,” 
reflecting unexamined assumptions about how the United States’ 
Warren Court’s constitutional framework played out in the legal field. 
In the third and fourth schemas, two modes of policy transfer are 
evident: policy emulation through lesson drawing—both positive and 
negative—and elite networking through the participation of Israeli 
academics and policymakers in the academic conversation about 
American criminal justice. These different currents reflect multiple 
voices within both countries whose opinions about criminal justice 
reform run the political gamut. I then attempt to make sense of the 
particular relationship between Israel and the United States by relying 
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on Malcolm Feeley’s recent application of a political science 
framework, American Political Development (APD), to the criminal 
justice field.14 As I argue here, the United States and Israel share 
numerous characteristics of developing countries, by contrast to their 
usual perception as highly developed nations. These characteristics, 
despite the different context and difference in size, imply that the two 
nations face similar challenges in criminal justice: deep-seated 
institutional and cultural racism and nationalism, a culture of violence, 
and high levels of political corruption. These challenges mean that, just 
as the United States would be better advised to abandon its isolationist 
policies and look comparatively at criminal justice, Israel would be 
better advised to deepen the nuance of its relationship with the United 
States and look for inspiration elsewhere. 
I. THE GREAT NEW LIGHT FROM THE WEST 
A. Israel as a British Colony 
Israeli law students reading old criminal law cases are often 
struck by how foreign their reasoning and references feel. Cases from 
the 1950s in particular retain a foreign flavor, part of which can be 
attributed to the foreign legal education of the first Supreme Court 
Justices.15 However, much of the “foreignness” of these cases comes 
from the multiple and dense references to British caselaw to illuminate 
the Criminal Law Ordinance of 1936,16 a relic of Mandatory Britain that 
remained in effect well into the late 1970s. 
The Ordinance was not a carbon copy of British criminal law. 
Rather, it was a version of it, adapting British principles, to be used in 
British colonies, which were deemed to be unsuitable for some or all 
of British Law.17 Indeed, the practice of criminal justice in Mandatory 
Palestine was tailored to the realities of the colonies; as Binyamin Blum 
 
14 Malcolm Feeley, How to Think About Criminal Court Reform, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 673 
(2018). 
15 Fania Oz-Salzberger & Eli Salzberger, The Secret German Sources of the Israeli 
Supreme Court, 3 Ind. U. Press 159, 159-60 (1998). 
16 Criminal Law Ordinance 1936 (Isr.) 
17 See Binyamin Blum, The Hounds of Empire: Forensic Dog Tracking in Britain and 
its Colonies, 1888-1953, 35 LAW & HIST. REV. 621 (2017). 
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explains, several forensic practices, such as the use of sniffing dogs18 
or establishing age on the basis of bone measurements,19 were endemic 
to the realities of the colonies and to their perception by the colonizers, 
which was Orientalist at best and racist at worst. 
Even assuming these limitations, the Ordinance did not even 
come close to capturing the theory and logic of criminal law in a 
common law system with centuries of caselaw. Judges and lawyers in 
Mandatory Palestine had to keep up with British precedent to provide 
interpretation and to fill the gaps in the statutory framework. This was 
not mere custom; it was required by The King’s Speech at Council for 
Eretz Israel, 1922-1947, which stated in Section 46 that British law was 
to be mandatory precedent in the colony.20 
This dependence on British precedent remained in place after 
Israel gained its independence. In the Ordinance of Government and 
Legal Orders of 1949, put in place just as Israel became an independent 
country, continuity and good order were guaranteed by preserving 
legal institutions as they had been under British rule. Indeed, Section 
11 reads: “The law that was in order in Eretz Israel on 14 of May 1948 
shall remain in place, to the extent that it does not contradict this 
ordinance or other laws given by the Temporary State Council or 
according to it and with the appropriate changes.”21 As a consequence, 
and in order to maintain continuity, Israeli law continued to refer back 
to British law for decades. 
The strong British flavor of these decisions, however, faded 
some over time. First, as the Supreme Court of Israel began issuing 
criminal law precedents, it created its own case law, gradually 
“Israelizing” subsequent decisions to build on these precedents. And 
second, throughout the decades that followed, British law continued 
to develop independently, and as legal doctrines began diverging, 
British law became less and less relevant. Its relevance to criminal and 
tort law, however, endured longer than in other legal disciplines: 
during the 1960s, Israeli business law shifted away from British 




20 Dvar Ha’Melech BaMoatza 46. 
21 Law & Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 7 (1948) (Isr.). 
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inspiration.22 Even when an Israeli penal code was finally enacted in 
1977, it retained the cumbersome structures of British law, while 
prominent Israeli jurists, Schneor-Zalman Feller and Mordechai 
Kremnitzer, severely critiqued it and pointed to the advantages of 
following continental legal principles, which they considered clearer 
and more comprehensive.23 
B. The Fall of British Law 
The late 1970s saw a pull away from British law, which was 
partly inspired by the political upheaval of the 1977 election. The 
election brought the Likud party, for the first time in the country’s 
history, to political power; this move shook many of the old 
hegemonies to the core. This political transformation, coupled with the 
already undermined connection to British law, were the driving force 
behind the enactment of the Foundations of Law Act of 1981.24 The 
new statute struck down Section 46 of the King’s Council, thus 
severing Israeli law from its British counterpart, but keeping in place 
the precedents that had been established based on this legal 
dependency prior to 1981. In lieu of the recurrence to British law, the 
sources of legal influence were listed in a hierarchical order provided 
in Section 1 of the new statute: “If the court is faced with a legal 
question that requires a decision and cannot find an answer in 
legislation, case law, or by analogy, it shall decide in light of the 
principles of freedom, justice, rectitude, and peace of Israeli Legacy.”25 
While connections to British law were now officially 
dismantled, and comparative law was not explicitly mentioned, Israeli 
case law continued to look outside its borders for influence. As 
mentioned above, continental influence was already deeply evident in 
 
22 Contract Law, 5727-1967 (Isr.). 
23 Schneor Zalman Feller and Mordechai Kremnitzer, Proposal for a Preamble and a 
General Part for the Penal Law – Changes Proposed by the Authors, 17 MISHPATIM 
392 (1988). 
24 Foundations of Law Act, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 181 (1980) (Isr.). 
25 Section 1 of the Foundations of Law Act was amended in 2018 to explicitly 
reference Hebrew law, generally understood to encompass Mishnaic and Talmudic 
law, as a residual source of influence. The impact of religious Jewish law on modern 
Israeli law had been a serious bone of contention in the Supreme Court in the 1980s 
and 1990s, but elaboration on this topic exceeds the framework of this paper. Id. 
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the structure of new business legislature, in particular contracts. But a 
new light would emerge in the West as a strong source of influence – 
American law. 
C. United States Law Emerges 
It is difficult to provide a definite explanation for the strong 
appeal of U.S. law as a source of inspiration for Israeli jurists. In terms 
of substantive attractiveness, one important feature is the existence of 
a robust written constitution, which both British and Israeli law lack. 
In Israel, the traditional explanation for the decision to make do with 
“Basic Laws” in lieu of a constitution was the concern that the 
heterogeneity of the population would make it difficult to agree on a 
constitution,26 though newer accounts attribute the hesitation to the 
demographic threat.27 But the United States features not only a 
constitution that encompasses individual rights and governmental 
structure, but also one that is regularly used and interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in ways that are useful for a nation that purports to 
value fundamental rights even when they are unwritten. 
It is no coincidence that Israel turned to U.S. law. Pnina Lahav 
dates the “American moment” in Israeli scholarship to 1967, when two 
friends, Aharon Barak and Itzhak Zamir, returned to Jerusalem from 
studying at Harvard.28 The two academics were to become influential 
figures in Israeli law, both in government and at the Supreme Court. 
By the 1980s, Lahav argues, the academic enchantment with American 
scholarship was such that “old school” academics, who valued British 
and European models, warned against an Americanization of Israeli 
academia. The younger Tel Aviv University was more keen on 
adopting American educational reforms than the established Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, which was structured after the German 
model, but even the latter would see changes in its scholarship, 
doctrinal influences, and pedagogy in later years. 
 
26 Harari Resolution, 5 Knesset Protocols 1743 (1950) (Isr.). 
27 Aviram Shachal, “Protecting the Majority: The Constitution as a Blocking 
Mechanism,” lecture at the 15th Annual Conference of the Israeli Law and History 
Association, Nov. 26, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IvUC86_Avno. 
28 Pnina Lahav, American Moment(s): When, How, and Why Did Israeli Law Faculties 
Come to Resemble Elite U.S. Law Schools, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 653 (2009). 
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What made the U.S. constitution especially attractive in the 
criminal justice context was the Warren Court’s revolution of 
fundamental rights, and particularly the incorporation of the 
exclusionary rule against the states, which impressed Israeli academics 
(who inaccurately identified it as Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine) 
as a paragon of civil rights. Even after the Burger Court began to 
reverse course and limit the reach of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments, other countries were fascinated by the ability to educate 
and deter law enforcement through the admissibility of evidence.29 
The impact of the exclusionary rule, the Miranda warnings, and the 
right to counsel, would be even more evident during the following 
decade. 
Another important factor was the rise in prominence of the 
American legal system in popular culture. From the 1970s, as films and 
television shows featuring American courtroom dramas appeared 
more and more on Israeli screens,30 the drama and excitement of 
dramatic trials with juries (which are foreign to the Israeli context) 
might have had something to do with the rise of U.S. law as an 
inspiration. 
Finally, there was the matter of convenience. U.S. law became 
increasingly accessible due to the library system of cases, which 
included methods of cross-referencing and Shepherdizing. Law 
students in Israel were taught these systems as part of their university 
library tours and were increasingly educated by faculty who did their 
doctorates, or post-doctorates, in the United States—a quicker and less 
onerous course of study than the one in Israel. 
Proof of the rise of U.S. law during this era is hard, but citation 
studies can provide a hint. In 1995, Yoram Shachar, Ron Harris, and 
 
29 For more on these factors, see Part II. 
30 Zionist leaders resisted importing series from the United States out of fear that the 
nation’s idealistic spirit would be corrupted; in the 1960s, before the emergence of 
cable channels, Israeli viewers had access to American television only by capturing 
Jordanian television using their antennae. The struggle for more varied programming 
content went hand in hand with the struggle to allow Israelis to purchase television 
sets that could broadcast in color, which ended only in the late 1970s. See generally 
Tasha Oren, Demon in the Box: Jews, Arabs, Politics, and Culture in the Making of 
Israeli Television (2004); Shayna Weiss, Israeli Television: A history of a nation 
through the small screen, My Jewish Learning, https://www.myjewishlearning.com/
article/israeli-television/. 
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Meron Gross conducted a study of Israeli Supreme Court citations 
between 1948 and 1994.31 In 1948, Israeli opinions referred to British 
sources 24.4% of the time and did not refer to any American sources. 
By 1994, only 2.3% of citations were British sources, and the number of 
American citations rose to 5.1%. Between 1982-1983, American sources 
eclipsed British sources in terms of their relative frequency in the 
decisions.32
 
A notable record in American citations occurred during the 
years 1992 and 1993, which saw American sources cited 11.4% and 
12.0% in Israeli decisions, respectively.33 A possible explanation of this 
trend follows in Part II. But before examining the role of the early- to 
mid-nineties in solidifying the eminence of U.S. law in decisions, it is 
necessary to add a note about the extent to which the United States 
itself sought influence in other areas. 
 
31 Yoram Shachar et al., Citation Practices of Israel's Supreme Court, Quantitative 
Analysis, 27 HEBREW U. L. REV. 119 (1996). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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D. A One-Way Trend 
The United States was also, of course, a British colony. 
Nonetheless, one would be hard pressed to find references to British 
law—or, for that matter, any foreign law—in American jurisprudence. 
As Rebecca Lefler notes, “American courts have always been reluctant 
to employ foreign decisions other than the historic English cases used 
to explain common law roots.” Indeed, American isolationism is not 
unique to the court: 
 
[A]s Mathias Reimann has pointed out, “[i]n the 
United States today, [international] comparative law 
does not play nearly as prominent a role in teaching, 
scholarship, and practice as one would expect in our 
allegedly cosmopolitan age.” Bruce Ackerman has 
noted that in a world where technology is making 
worldwide information available at our fingertips, 
“the global transformation has not yet had the slightest 
impact on American constitutional thought. The 
typical American judge would not think of learning 
from an opinion by the German or French 
constitutional court.” Instead, foreign law is treated as 
inherently suspicious. John H. Langbein has 
commented, “American legal dialogue starts from the 
premise that no relevant insights are to be found 
beyond the water’s edge.” Indeed, the works of the 
U.S. Supreme Court confirm such observations.34 
 
American exceptionalism is not limited to scorn of foreign 
authorities; it manifests itself clearly in criminal justice policies that set 
the United States apart from other developed nations. The United 
States is the only developed nation to retain the death penalty, de jure 
and de facto; to offer lax gun control; and to incarcerate 1 of 100 of its 
 
34 Rebecca Lefler, A Comparison of Comparison: Use of Foreign Case Law as 
Persuasive Authority by the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of 
Canada, and the High Court of Australia, 111 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INTERDISC. L. 
J. 165, 166 (2001). 
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inhabitants, a rate that puts it far above both developed and 
developing nations. 
Despite the problematic nature of the American criminal 
justice system, the United States became embedded in Israeli 
consciousness as an extremely pro-defendant, pro-due-process 
jurisdiction. This explains its influence on litigation and legislation 
during the Decade of Rights. 
II. THE DECADE OF RIGHTS 
The early 1990s were characterized by a fundamental 
bifurcation between American and European-inspired legislative and 
policy developments. In the area of criminal procedure, the perception 
of the United States as a pro-defendant jurisdiction led to its imprint 
on some monumental Israeli legal occurrences, the most significant of 
which was the enactment of the Basic Law of Human Dignity and 
Liberty,35 followed by a decision by the High Court of Justice that 
ordinary statutes could be declared void if they contradicted a 
principle in said Basic Law.36 The novelty of the new Basic Law was 
that, by contrast to its predecessors from the 1950s, it addressed 
fundamental rights, rather than the structure of government. In that 
respect, this Basic Law was the equivalent of the United States’ Bill of 
Rights, which was brought up in its legislative process.37 
The new Basic Law’s most relevant section to criminal justice 
was Section 5, which reads: “it is prohibited to take away or limit a 
person’s freedom through arrest, imprisonment, or in any other way.” 
Like other sections in the Basic Law, violations of this section require 
Knesset legislation enacted for a worthy cause and avoiding 
disproportionate impact.38 These requirements guaranteed judicial 
review that monitored not only the values behind a limiting law, but 
also its reach. 
 
35 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992). 
36 Civil Appeal 6821/93 Bank HaMizrachi HaMeuchad, Inc. v. Migdal, a Cooperative 
Village, PD 49(4) 221 (1993). 
37 Knesset Remarks, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, at https://main.knesset.
gov.il/Activity/plenum/Pages/SessionItem.aspx?itemID=160519 
38 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, at § 9 (Isr.). 
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It is no coincidence that Section 5 somewhat resembles the U.S. 
Fourth Amendment. In the years preceding and surrounding the 
enactment of the Basic Law, the leading academic authorities in Israeli 
criminal justice, such as Ya’acov Kedmy and Eliyahu Harnon, tended 
to portray U.S. search and seizure law as being extremely pro-
defendant. This was particularly evident in the Israeli conversation 
around the exclusionary rule, which was regarded by Israelis much as 
it was regarded by the Nixon administration: as an extremely 
formalistic pro-defendant rule that might allow people to get off on 
technicalities. 
Israeli criminal justice textbooks of the era, both academic39 
and popular,40 tended to confound the exclusionary rule with its U.S. 
extension, the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree exception.41 The distinction 
in the United States is that the former refers to any evidence obtained 
by unconstitutional means, whereas the latter refers to evidence 
obtained through legal means, but whose roots can be attributed to an 
unconstitutional action earlier in the chain of the police’s evidence-
gathering work. Israeli scholars of the 1980s and 1990s tended to merge 
the two terms and refer to the American exclusionary rule as the “fruit 
of the poisonous tree” doctrine. 
But more importantly, as Binyamin Blum highlights in his 
work on the exclusionary rule, Israeli academics and policymakers 
tended to misperceive the American rule as having vast reach and no 
exceptions. 42 At the time that these proclamations were made and this 
sort of criminal procedure was taught in Israel, this had already been 
untrue in the United States for at least a decade. 
Nixon’s appointees to the Supreme Court had changed the 
Supreme Court’s makeup enough to start eating away at criminal 
procedure guarantees in general and at Fourth Amendment 
protections in particular. The Court ruled that any disclosures to third 
 
39 MOSHE SHALGI AND ZVI COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1981); Ya’acov Kedmy, 
On Criminal Procedure – the Law in Light of Cases (1992). 
40 SASSI GEZ AND MOSHE RONEN, CRIMINAL LAW – A GUIDE TO CRIMINAL LAW IN 
ISRAEL (2001). 
41 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne v. United States, 251 
U.S. 385 (1920). 
42 Binyamin Blum, Exclude Evidence, You Exclude Justice? A Critical Evaluation of 
Israel’s Exclusionary Rule After Issacharov, 16 SW. J. OF INT’L. L. 385, 413 (2010). 
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parties—friends, phone companies, and the like—were tantamount to 
a relinquishment of the reasonable expectation of privacy protected by 
the Fourth Amendment.43 Broad exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, in cases of search incident to arrest,44 automobiles,45 
public arrests,46 etc., were put in place. Even during the Warren 
Court’s golden years, Earl Warren himself authorized a decision that 
allowed warrantless stops and frisks based on considerably less 
suspicion than the probable cause standard in the Fourth 
Amendment,47 which were expanded to car frisks48 and home frisks49 
well before the Israeli codification of search and seizure rights. By the 
1980s, U.S. academia had widely recognized the conservative shift in 
policing and held conferences about it.50 Even as early as 1972, Herbert 
Packer himself—who had identified and hailed the Due Process 
revolution in his famous book The Limits of the Criminal Sanction51--
expressed his despair over the failure of the due process model.52 
Israeli textbooks and policy documentation from the 1980s and 
1990s were oblivious to this turn in policy. Those who supported 
suspect and defendants’ rights hailed the U.S. system (as they 
imagined it) as the way to guarantee proper police behavior, and 
detractors highlighted concerns over guilty people walking free. This 
controversy, with the idealized American comparator, characterized 
another criminal justice debate: the fight over the validity of 
confessions extracted through coercive means. Several years prior to 
 
43 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979) (requiring warrants for a GPS tracking device); United States v. White, 401 
U.S. 745 (1971). 
44 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
45 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). 
46 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
47 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
48 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
49 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333 (1990). 
50 Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and 
Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L. J. 185, 186 (1983); Hadar Aviram, 
Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process Model, 36 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 237, 244 (2011). 
51 HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION, 245 (1968). 
52 Aviram, supra note 50 at 244 n.1 
326 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 28 
the High Court of Justice’s decision on torture,53 Israeli courts followed 
a pragmatic standard: confessions would be excluded only if the judge 
thought that the method of obtaining them raised serious doubts as to 
their truthfulness.54 Importantly, the Israeli system relied not on 
jurors, but on professional judges, whose discretion and ability to take 
into account the context and value of the evidence was considered 
better than that of laypeople. Therefore, the evidentiary system relied 
on “weight”: judges would exclude confessions that they deemed 
unreliable due to the circumstances of their provenance. With regard 
to other types of unreliable evidence—statements from accomplices, 
for example—evidence law required that they be supplemented by 
other pieces of evidence, albeit minor in persuasive weight, from an 
independent source.55 
One such independent piece of evidence would be a 
defendant’s silence at the police station. Here, too, Israel diverted from 
its perceived notion of U.S. law. Police officers in Israel were required 
to give Miranda-like warnings to suspects, but their content was 
slightly different: suspects in Israel would be warned that their silence 
at interrogation could also carry negative repercussions. In 
comparative discussions, Israeli scholars and lawyers would explain 
that, while different from the U.S. solution to the problem of police 
interrogations, this was an acceptable solution to the “trilemma” faced 
by criminal suspects: while still risky, a suspect’s silence carried less 
negative repercussions than a full or partial confession because it was 
merely a “piece” of evidence that would be weighed together with 
 
53 See HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government 
of Israel 2 Isr LR 459, 459-460 (2006) (Isr.). 
54 This doctrine was crystallized in a public report, chaired by Supreme Court Judge 
Moshe Landoy in 1987, which examined the admissibility of confessions extracted 
through torture. STATE INQUIRY COMMITTEE, LANDAU COMMISSION REPORT: 
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION METHODS OF THE GENERAL SECURITY 
SERVICE ON SUSPICIOUS HOSTILE ACTIVITIES 1 (1987), http://www.hamoked.org.il/
Document.aspx?dID=Documents1643. 
55 Israeli evidence law defines three such additional pieces of evidence: hizuk 
(“bolster”), siua (“assistance”) and dvar mah (“something”). See Evidence Ordinance, 
New Version – 1971, § 54a for an explanation on which of these additions is required 
for each type of testimony in a criminal case. 
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other evidence, and thus would have a lesser contribution toward a 
conviction.56 
The Israeli choice not to exclude confessions continued to be 
deeply contested. In 2006, a case that had begun in military courts, 
Issacharov v. the Military Prosecutor, finally found its way to the Israeli 
Supreme Court. There, a Court operating four years after the new Basic 
Law was in place decided to change legal doctrine and introduce a rule 
that took a step toward an exclusionary rule. Under the Issacharov rule, 
courts would have the discretion to exclude evidence obtained using 
“interrogation methods that violate instructions or unlawfully violate 
a protected civil right”, even if there is no concern about the 
authenticity or validity of the evidence itself.57 
Issacharov was hailed by some defendant rights’ advocates—
importantly, practicing public defenders—as a major victory for civil 
rights, in that it came closer to the shining American example of 
fairness and police deterrence.58 But the decision was also the subject 
of considerable academic critique which, interestingly, revolved 
around the perception that the Israeli Supreme Court did not go far 
enough, and rather than adopting a discretionary standard akin to the 
one in Canadian law, should have gone the full-exclusionary-rule 
route, as in the United States.59 Reading these critical opinions side by 
side, especially through the lens of Yoav Sapir (later to become Israel’s 
 
56 Blum, supra note 42, at 397. 
57 CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. The Chief Military Prosecutor, PD 61(1) 461 (2006). 
58 Inbal Rubinstein, The Revolution is Complete, 18 THE LAWYER 44 (January 2013). 
Ofer Sitbon, An Interview with Dr. Yoav Sapir, the Incoming Public Defender, 4 
MA’ASEI MISHPAT 39 (“In a situation of uncertainty, it seems to me easier and fairer 
to align oneself with the side that says ‘don’t convict’ than with the side that asks for 
a conviction”). Yoav Sapir, The Means Must be Justified, Too, 16 THE LAWYER 80 
(January 2012) . Yoav Sapir, A Tradition of Protecting Rights in the Criminal Process 
– Past, Present, and Future, 39 THE LAWYER 45 (April 2018). 
59 Keren Shapira-Ettinger & Ron Shapira, The Israeli Exclusion Rule at the Margins 
of Issacharov. 3 Din U’Dvarim 427 (2007). Boaz Sengero, The Exclusionary Rule for 
Evidence Obtained via Wrong Means Develops, But Still Without Willingness to Pay 
a Price (and Acquit a Guilty Defendant Who Is Still Alive), 4 Mishpat Al Atar 25 
(2012). Yuval Marin & Rinat Kitai-Sengero, Collins, Miranda, and Issacharov—on 
the Gap Between the Is and the Ought in the Issacharov Decision, 37 MISHPATIM 427 
(2012). Binyamin Blum, Exclude Evidence, You Exclude Justice? A Critical 
Evaluation of Israel’s Exclusionary Rules after Issacharov, 16 Sw. J. Int’l L. 385, 415-
16 (2010). 
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National Public Defender) and Guy Rubinstein,60 appears to be a 
debate not about the merits of the Israeli decision, but about what the 
U.S. exclusionary rule actually entailed. Sapir and Rubinstein argue 
that the academic critique saw the U.S. rule through rosy eyes, 
ignoring the post-Warren Courts’ contemptuous treatment of the 
exclusionary rule and its diminishing contribution to defendants’ 
rights. 
While Israeli solutions to these conundrums differed 
somewhat from the American ones, their adoption reflects a deep 
dialogue with the U.S. criminal justice system. This is even more 
evident in the new arrest law adopted in Israel in 1996.61 The new law, 
inspired by U.S. reliance on warrants, expressed a strong preference 
for judicial warrants for arrest, with only few exceptions for 
emergency (coming close to the imagined U.S. doctrine, but in fact 
being considerably more pro-defendant than that doctrine operated in 
practice.) The law also considerably shortened the period of time 
during which a suspect could be held before seeing a judge, requiring 
that the Israeli equivalent of a Gerstein hearing be held 24 hours after 
the initial arrest (with some allowances for Shabbat and holidays.)62 
The law’s rigidity had led to some perverse effects: rather than 
shortening the period of pretrial detention, it led to its lengthening, as 
officers who were unable to complete the investigation in 24 hours 
repeatedly sought, and invariably received, dispensation for judges to 
lengthen the detention.63 
Importantly, the reform in arrest law closely followed another 
U.S.-inspired shift: the establishment of Israel’s Public Defender’s 
Office. Prior to 1996, legal representation for indigent defendants in 
Israel was provided through a legal aid model, similar to the one in the 
 
60 Yoav Sapir & Guy Rubinstein, Issacharov’s Story: Issacharov in Action – On the 
Relative Exclusion Doctrine and Its Contribution to Privacy Rights, 10 Ma’asei 
Mishpat 333 (2019). 
61 Criminal Procedure Act (Powers of Enforcement – Arrest) (Isr.). 
62 Id. at § 29. 
63 Hagit Lernau, A Recipe for Inefficient Legislation: The Case of the Arrest Law, 
Public Defender’s Office, 2007, https://www.justice.gov.il/Units/SanegoriaZiborit/
Pirsumim/LernauHakika.pdf; Oren Gazal-Ayal & Dvir Yogev, Grim Thoughts on 
Unnecessary Arrests, 234 HaSanegor 21 (2016); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Ra’anan Sicilliano 
Keinan, Gal Einav & Atallah Shubash, Arabs and Jews in Initial Arrest Proceedings, 
38 Mishpatim 627, 2009. 
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UK. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, this system was savagely 
criticized both by a Ministry of Justice committee64 and by the Israeli 
Supreme Court.65 In 1993, a legislative effort to create a public defense 
office started, spearheaded by then-Minister of Justice David Libai and 
by Professor Kenneth Mann of Tel Aviv University. Mann, an 
immigrant from the United States educated at Berkeley and Yale, 
earned renown as an academic for his work on plea bargains (an area 
studied extensively in the United States at the time, but not in Israel),66 
and brought other U.S. innovations into Israeli legal education, such 
as legal clinics.67 After the establishment of the public defense in 
1995,68 Mann was appointed its first National Public Defender. The 
structure of establishing indigence, and the relationship between a 
pared-down “insider” staff, consisting of 100 lawyers and 160 non-
lawyer employees, and a larger, supervised cadre of “external” 
attorneys, were also U.S.-inspired.69 
These U.S.-inspired reforms were, however, limited to the 
areas of criminal procedure and criminal practice. By contrast, the area 
of substantive criminal law, more doctrinal and theoretical by nature, 
deliberately deviated from the fascination with U.S. law, and retained 
the more traditional European influences. Israel’s original penal code 
was derived from a British Mandate ordinance and substantive 
criminal law decisions frequently cited British precedents well into the 
1970s. A considerably overhauled new penal code was introduced in 
1994,70 and was inspired by German law rather than by U.S. law. It was 
 
64 The Public Defense: A History, Ministry of Law Website, https://www.
justice.gov.il/UNITS/SANEGORIAZIBORIT/ODOT/Pages/History.aspx. 
65 In Criminal Motion 353/87 State of Israel v. Ifargan et al. (1987) Judge Goldberg 
wrote that the state “did not think to create, alongside the court’s duty to appoint 
defense attorneys for Respondents, also tools that would enable it to comply with said 
duty.” Even more explicitly, in Criminal Appeal 134/89 Abargil v. the State of Israel 
(1989), Judge Dov Levin wrote that “if only it were possible to establish, side by side 
with the general prosecution that represents the state, also a general-public defense at 
the defendants’ service, that would be the desired solution that would be useful to the 
defendants but also to the law and justice apparatus.” 
66 ELIYAHU HARNON AND KENNETH MANN, PLEA BARGAINS IN ISRAEL (1976). 
67 Efrat Rosental, Social Responsibility: The Work of the Legal Clinics, Megafon (Jan. 
12, 2014), http://megafon-news.co.il/asys/archives/196100. 
68 Public Defense Act, 5756-1995 (Isr.). 
69 The Public Defense: A History, supra note 64. 
70 Penal Law, 5754-1994 (Isr.). 
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drafted by two academics that had consistently expressed admiration 
for the orderliness and clarity of German criminal law, and abhorrence 
toward the “gaming season” that characterized the plea-bargaining 
trade in the United States.71 
One possible reason for the distinction between substantive 
criminal law (influenced by the German code) and criminal procedure 
(influenced by the perception of U.S. law) might be the strong doctrinal 
orientation of Israeli legal scholars at the time. The law and society 
field, active in the United States since the late 1960s, was still nascent 
in Israel; empirical studies were mostly conducted by sociologists and 
criminologists who had little influence on the Israeli legislative field. 
Legal scholars, by contrast, were invested in normative conversations 
about civil rights, and might have been captivated by the Warren era 
rhetoric, rather than by the post-Warren courts’ interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights. Notably, despite the German nature of the penal code, 
references to U.S. law in substantive criminal law cases, and in other 
areas, continued to characterize much of Israeli litigation and judicial 
decision making. These would increasingly look to the West for 
punitive innovations in criminal justice, adopting them as soon as they 
became known in Israel, and often after empirical evidence in the 
United States already undermined their promise. We turn to these 
next. 
III: THE HEYDAY OF LAW AND ORDER 
During the late 1990s and the 2000s, Israeli policymakers, 
academics, and lawyers made multiple propositions for criminal 
justice reform which leaned heavily on the U.S. penchant for punitive 
reforms. As during the Rights Decade, this phase also evinces 
enthusiasm about everything American, but it is qualitatively different 
from the previous schema. While the Decade of Rights saw fascination 
with a formal, inaccurate perception of U.S. law based on an outdated 
and naïve reading of the Warren Court’s work and ignorance of its 
subsequent undoing by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, the Heyday 
of Law and Order saw fascination with actual practices in the United 
States, seeing these reforms for what they were. These policies tended 
 
71 Mordechai Kremnitzer, Making Criminal Procedure Suitable to the Goal of Truth 
Finding, or Is It Not Time Yet to End the Gaming Season, 17 MISPHATIM 475 (1988). 
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to be more practice-oriented, and they also tended to lean in the 
opposite direction than the exclusionary rule: they were law and order 
reforms designed to increase law enforcement efficiency, restrict post-
conviction remedies, and award crime victims more punitive power. 
A micro-analysis here is necessary: often, innovations would 
emerge in Israeli law enforcement as “imported goods” by academics 
with strong American connections. In the case of Israeli policing, such 
an academic was David Weisburd of the Hebrew University’s Institute 
of Criminology, who worked closely with police departments in the 
United States on reform based on situational crime prevention. 
Weisburd consulted with Israeli police on the implementation of 
community policing, COMPSTAT, and “hot spot” responsiveness. The 
osmosis of these reforms into Israeli police culture were quicker than 
their implementation in the United States because, by contrast to the 
United States’ 40,000 police departments, Israel employs a national 
police force. While some of these policing techniques, particularly the 
various forms of community policing, held some promise,72 some of 
them, such as COMPSTAT, had already garnered mixed reviews in the 
United States when they were implemented in Israel, and the resources 
and infrastructure they required were not available in Israel.73 
A more complicated story involves the introduction of victim 
rights advocacy into the Israeli scene. Victims were always at the 
forefront of the Israeli conversation regarding the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, with military widows and orphans occupying center stage as 
symbolic representations of the sacrifices involved in the conflict.74 
Moreover, the Institute of Criminology at Hebrew University 
regularly taught a victimology course, based on a considerable 
heritage of scholarly interest: Menachem Amir’s Patterns of Forcible 
Rape,75 published in 1971, which examined victim-offender relations 
and provoked controversy in identifying risk behaviors for victims 
 
72 Danny Gimshi, A Basic Plan For Strategic Implementation of Community Policing 
in Israel (1995). 
73 Maya Goldschlag and Ofer Shabtai, The COMPSTAT Program at the NYPD and Its 
Implementation in Israel, 1999-2000, 6 POLICE AND SOCIETY 135 (2002). 
74 Victor Florian, Asa Kasher and Ruth Malkinson, Public and media perception of 
bereaved families in Israel: A national survey, 2 MEGAMOT 280 (2000); Edna 
Lomsky-Feder, From Agent of National Memory to Local Mnemonic Community: The 
School Memorial Ceremony for Fallen Soldiers, 3 MEGAMOT 353 (2003). 
75 Menachem Amir, Patterns of Forcible Rape (1971). 
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and defining “victim-precipitated rape”, a concept which feminist 
critics interpreted, understandably, as victim blaming and a form of 
absolving sexual assailants.76 More understanding of victims’ 
perspectives was Leslie Sebba’s Third Parties,77 which was already 
attentive to the increased American attention to the topic: victim bills-
of-rights, victim consultation obligations at various steps of the 
criminal process, and the difference between the prosecutors’ public 
duties and the victims’ interests. But victims of domestic crime came 
to occupy a prominent role in the criminal justice conversation only in 
2001, with the enactment of the Rights of Crime Victims Law.78 Uri 
Yanay and Tali Gal attribute this important development to the 
formation of a coalition of victims’ rights organizations, which focused 
particularly on women and children.79 These organizations reached 
out to academics in the field, organized Israel’s first conference on 
victims’ rights, and lobbied the Public Attorney’s Office to support a 
legal enshrinement of victims’ rights in the criminal process. 
A further development was the establishment of the Noga 
Center for Victims’ Rights at the legal college in Kiriat Ono in 2004.80 
Dr. Dana Pugach, the founder of the Center, was educated in the UK, 
where she witnessed little to no exposure to issues of victims’ rights 
and no engagement with the American literature on the topic.81 
Transitioning to advocacy from academia, Pugach shaped the Center 
as a legal-therapeutic hub of services for victims, the first of which was 
a call-in emergency number. In addition, the Center operated two legal 
clinics, one for representing victims in serious criminal trials and one 
for operating a helpdesk for other victims at a lower court. But the 
Noga Center would soon become an important player on the national 
 
76 Id. For an example of how Amir’s terminology continues to fuel feminist discourse 
today, see Lilia M. Cortina et al., Beyond Blaming the Victim: Toward a More 
Progressive Understanding of Workplace Mistreatment, 11 Indus. and Organizational 
Psychol. 81 (2018). 
77 LESLIE SEBBA, THIRD PARTIES: VICTIMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996). 
78 Rights of Crime Victims Law (2001) (Isr.). 
79 Uri Yanay & Tali Gal, Lobbying for Rights: Crime Victims in Israel, in 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF VICTIMOLOGY 373, 379 (Paul Knepper et al., eds.) 
(2010). 
80 Noga Center for Victims’ Rights, https://www.ono.ac.il/academy/social-agenda/
noga-center/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
81 Email from Dr. Dana Pugach (August 13, 2019, 2:08pm EST) (on file with author). 
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stage, submitting proposals to the Knesset and offering legal opinions 
on initiatives pertaining to victims. 
Many of the Noga Center’s legal achievements echoed 
developments in the United States. In 2007, they succeeded in lobbying 
for a legislative amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code that 
would allow victims to submit a statement for sentencing (prior to the 
amendment, this option was available only for victims of sex 
offenders).82 The Center also contributed, as amicus curiae, to a 
Supreme Court decision to allow crime victims in certain cases to 
appear physically before the parole board.83 Both of these 
accomplishments for victims echoed U.S. developments in the prior 
two decades. In 1982, President Reagan convened a Task Force on 
Victims of Crime, which recommended over a hundred reforms aimed 
at making the victim heard at all critical stages of the criminal process. 
In the same year, California voters approved Proposition 8, known as 
the Victim’s Bill of Rights, which required reaching out to the victim 
for an impact statement prior to sentencing and at parole hearings. 
This was not the first time that victims’ perspectives were allowed in 
court and at a hearing. Since the 1920s, various jurisdictions 
introduced victims’ statements through probation officers’ reports, 
and some California counties, such as Fresno, allowed victims to speak 
even before victim allocution became part of the state’s penal code. 
By the time these developments were implemented in Israel, 
the U.S. criminal justice field was already divided as to their value. 
Some writers, such as Douglas Beloof, were strong supporters of a 
voice for victims in the process; Beloof, inspired by Herbert Packer’s 
classic two models, posited a “third model” of the criminal process.84 
By contrast, Kent Roach’s Four Models of the Criminal Process, written 
in 1999 as a variation on Herbert Packer’s 1968 classic,85 posited two 
 
82 Amendment 187 Criminal Procedure Code (Isr.). 
83 Permission for Criminal Appeal 10439/08 State of Israel v. Samir Ganameh et al. 
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models of victims’ rights: a punitive model that “affirms the retributive 
and expressive importance of punishment and the need for the rights 
of victims to be considered along with the rights of the accused” and a 
non-punitive model that “attempts to minimize the pain of both 
victimization and punishment by stressing crime prevention and 
restorative justice.” 86  While both models, Roach explained, were 
aimed at increasing respect for victims, “the punitive model focuses all 
of its energy on the criminal justice system and the administration of 
punishment while the non-punitive model branches out into other 
areas of social development and integration.”87 The victims’ rights 
movement had opted for the former model rather than the latter, 
which prompted praise from some88 and deep concern from others.89 
Perhaps the best achievement of punitive victims’ rights 
advocates was the passage of a series of bills involving restrictions on, 
and the registration of, sex offenders. The first bill to pass, in 2001, 
required public employers in settings involving minors or people with 
disabilities to request any prospective employees to bring an approval 
from the Israeli police department that they have not been convicted 
of a sex offense.90 Even though the Knesset approved a framework for 
implementing the law,91 the law was not effectively implemented; two 
years after its passage, the Commission for Child Safety found out that 
none of the summer camps in Jerusalem ever asked their prospective 
employers for police certification.92 The procedure for obtaining a 
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clearance certificate was delineated only in 2013,93 including a list of 
institutions that would present an employment challenge that ranged 
from schools and hospitals to zoos, playgrounds, and swimming 
pools. In 2010, the law was amended to include a vaguely defined 
residual category.94  
In 2004, a second bill allowed criminal courts, upon conviction 
of a sex offender, to forbid the convict from residing, working, and/or 
studying in the area where the victim resides.95 This, as Pugach 
explains, was a practical measure in addressing the plight of particular 
victims.96 However, under the bill, the court can place such restrictions 
in response not only to a prosecutor’s request, but a victim or a victim 
representative—reflecting the growing importance of the Noga Center 
and other organized victim advocacy initiatives. This bill, as well, 
drew ire because of the lags in its implementation, leading some 
neighborhoods to inquire about the possibility of advertising photos 
of convicted sex offenders around the neighborhood to prevent the 
“wave of pedophiliac attacks.”97 After a two-year drafting process, in 
2006, the Law for Defending the Public from Sex Crime Perpetrators, 
was enacted98--a comprehensive bill that created a “risk assessor” 
position, and required that courts, prisons, parole boards, psychiatric 
release boards and other decisionmakers receive a risk assessment 
about a person convicted of a sex offense before making decisions 
about their sentence, placement, or release. More importantly, the bill 
required the Minister of Internal Security to establish a “supervision 
unit” that would make recommendations to the court as to the need 
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for supervision of particular sex offenders. Courts, in turn, can issue 
an order requiring sex offenders to comply, which involves entering 
their names into a registry. The registry, for a maximum, but 
renewable, period of five years, would be open to law enforcement, 
risk assessors, and military authorities, but not to the public. 
The natural comparison made in the discussion of these bills 
was the U.S. sex offender registry, which is open to the public through 
Megan’s Law.99 The Israeli registry deliberately deviated from the U.S. 
model,100 because, as explained in Ha’aretz newspaper— 
Sources in the Ministry of Justice say that the system in 
the United States and in the United Kingdom has 
utterly failed, and according to [these sources] led to 
harassment of sex offenders. They explain that public 
information sends a message to the public that they can 
take the law into their own hands, and that led to the 
commission of crimes, such as arson, against the sex 
offenders. The message, the sources explain, should be 
that the state takes care of the public and does not 
abandon the public to take care of itself. Therefore, 
there should be a confidential governmental registry, 
which will enable surveillance and control of the 
pedophiles and grant the state the authority to search 
the offender’s home and other limitations.101 
Indeed, other journalistic reports about the U.S. registry 
highlighted its negative aspects, concluding that online access to the 
whereabouts of sex offenders “has ended in murderous crusades.”102 
The story shows a cautionary tale and highlights the deliberate aspect 
of the Israeli divergence: 
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Less than a month ago, a new unit of the prison 
authority devoted for supervising released sex 
offenders started operating in Israel . . . . In the first step 
. . . the unit will register 130-150 released offender. In 
the next step, all sex offenders that hurt minors, about 
700 people, will be registered. So far, no one is 
discussing notifying the public, and certainly not 
establishing a website.103 
Additional stories highlighted difficult clashes about values 
and policies in the context of U.S. litigation regarding the 
constitutionality of various aspects of Megan’s Law: “Is the status of 
sex offenders different from that of other criminals in a way that 
justifies their separation from society for life, even after they complete 
serving their sentences?”104 
But not everyone agreed that disclosing the names was a bad 
idea. In a different journalistic story, which preceded the 2004 bill, 
Professor Immanuel Gross was quoted saying that “in balancing the 
individual’s interest in rehabilitation and privacy with the 
community’s right to be protected from him, the community’s interest 
prevails.” The complexity of drafting the bill led Itzhak Kadman, the 
Director of the Child Safety Commission, to comment, “true, it is a 
complicated subject, but we’ve lost three precious years, and in the 
meantime, every year, at least 5,000 children are sexually hurt.”105 
The public debate about the registry intensified as the public 
became aware of the problems in implementing the modest Israeli law. 
In May 2007, Ha’aretz newspaper reported serious lags in the 
identification and registration of sex offenders. The story relied on 
information from the Ministry of Health, according to which the 
delays occurred both at the clinical risk assessment level and at the 
court order level.106 It also reported an unpleasant exchange at the 
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Knesset Committee for Legislation, in which the Chair chided the 
prison mental health authorities for the delays. A further scathing 
critique of the government’s failure to properly protect the public 
ensued when Ha’aretz reported that the government asked the 
Knesset to delay the starting time for the supervision legislation.107 
Kadman accused the relevant governmental offices, who “had almost 
two years to prepare for the law’s implementation and failed”, of 
“serious misdeeds.” The delayed proposal met with harsh opposition 
across the political spectrum and was canceled a day later.108 
Against this backdrop of calls for improved public safety, KM 
Eli Aflalo proposed a Bill for Fighting Pedophiles, 109 which was 
endorsed by the government.110 The proposal was a much more 
Americanized approach to sex offender supervision in two major 
ways: it advocated for a public registry, accessible online a-la Megan’s 
Law, and for court-ordered medical treatment of sex offenders using 
chemicals such as testosterone blockers.111 Under the proposal, the 
treatment would be mandated, in addition to a prison sentence, and 
would require the convict’s consent. Consenting convicts would 
receive a two-year sentencing discount, in addition to their parole. 
The proposal was not without its detractors: KM Shelly 
Yechimovich argued that “there is a clear boundary in punishment in 
an enlightened country and it passes right where you don’t maim a 
person as punishment or as means of prevention.” Yechimovich 
compared the incentives for chemical castration to the custom of 
amputating thieves’ hands in Saudi Arabia.112 
Detraction came from outside the Knesset, too. Shortly after 
the preliminary approval of the bill, the Israel Bar published its 
opinion, in which it stressed the need to consider “the public need—
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on one hand, and the potential harm to offenders who finished serving 
their sentence—on the other.”113 The Bar offered its support for  
arranging the rehabilitative process of sex offenders 
and returning them to society, [insofar as it is] 
conditioned on the consent of the offender”, but 
offered strong opposition to a public registry, arguing 
that it “violate[d] the spirit and aim of the Criminal 
Record and Expungement Law of 1981, to limit access 
to criminal records so as to minimize the expected 
harm to rehabilitated offenders.114  
They expressed concern about a “slippery slope . . . an 
increased demand to expose criminal records of other offenders”115 
and, importantly, pointed out that “against the real, harsh 
consequence of an eternal Mark of Cain . . . the practical experience of 
similar registries in other countries shows that their efficacy in 
neutralizing the public risk of sex offenders is marginal.”116 
The National Public Defense was even more resolute: in their 
written opinion they “vehemently oppose[d] the proposed law”117 
which, they argued was “legislation influenced by social anxiety.” 
They explicitly identified the new law as an “effort to import the 
American ‘Megan’s Law’” and stated that, since its enactment in the 
United States, 
there has been enough research evidence to enable us 
to critically examine the bill. The conclusions from the 
studies are unambiguous: there is no place for the 
proposed registry in legislation, both because the 
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registry is ineffective and because of its severe 
violation of human rights.118 
After its preliminary approval by the Knesset by a majority of 
24 to 4, the bill shifted to the Legislative Committee,119 where it led an 
erratic life. The Committee discussion in 2008 featured the following 
endorsement from the bill’s proposer, KM Eli Aflalo: 
In research that we’ve done we found that most 
enlightened countries in the world have such a 
registry. There are some countries where it is even 
more extreme, like the Netherlands and other 
countries, where a pedophile has to fly a flag over the 
house where he lives. I don’t suggest adopting this 
extreme path and I don’t want to say this is the final 
solution . . . but I argue that we have to take all 
measures.120 
Not everyone agreed with KM Aflalo’s perception of 
comparative law. The Committee’s legal advisor, Efrat Rosen, said: 
“We must examine whether this is an issue in which it is appropriate 
to follow the United States.” She added that research done in the last 
few years showed various problems, such as a false sense of security 
among the public and ineffectiveness in preventing repeat sex 
offending in the community.121 Aflalo then clarified: 
I want to say that my impression is—and if it isn’t so, I 
apologize—that it is all over the world. I did say at the 
beginning that there are surveys that said there are 
some things that are maybe not alright, but it’s a fact 
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that in all the places it continues to operate and it 
operates.122 
By 2010, the proposal had been bifurcated into two new bills: 
a chemical castration bill from 2009 and an open registry bill in 2010.123 
At the Committee’s discussion of the new version, the chair, KM David 
Rotem, opened by explaining that a third aspect of sex offender 
policy—rehabilitation—was not included in the bills. KM Moshe 
Matalon replied that the bills had come up before the Knesset several 
times, “made headlines”, and then the proposing legislators were 
regularly “accused of populism.”124 In the discussion, the proponents 
stressed that medical treatment would be voluntary, albeit resulting in 
lighter sentences, and that treatment options could range from 
chemical treatment in prison to therapeutic options in the community. 
What provoked considerable discussion was whether it was 
appropriate to open the registry to the public. The Ministry of Justice 
representative, Amit Marari, stated the Ministry’s position against 
opening the registry: 
[T]he responsibility to prevent sex offenses is [on] the 
state and not the private citizen. We would not want a 
private citizen to feel obligated to enforce the law. We 
are aware that people would want to know who their 
neighbor is and whether he committed a sex offense, 
but in the balance of interests we think this is the right 
balance. I also have to say that the open registry, and 
that is the lesson from places that have an open 
registry, can increase the dangerousness of sex 
offenders in that it prevents them to rehabilitate, it 
leads them underground and raises their level of 
dangerousness.125 
To which KM Aflalo interjected: “according to a survey that 
was done it actually triggers them to come and get the treatment. It’s 
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the opposite.” And KM Matalon added: “this is something worth 
discussing.”126 
Kadman offered critique of the breadth of the existing registry. 
He said that “our registry, as opposed to other countries, is not open 
to the public, but at least for those who need to know, the registry has 
to also include low risk sex offenders.” Marari interjected that “they 
can get this information from the [general] criminal registry. There are, 
after all, two registries.”127 
Dr. David Cohen from the Health Ministry explained that  
there is enough documentation that these registries can 
trigger other offenses. One thing they do is that sex 
offenders who return to established neighborhood, 
when the neighborhood is very organized and there 
are resources to put pressure on them, move to weak 
neighborhoods, where they can disappear into the 
population unnoticed.128 
Following the committee discussion, the Attorney General’s 
office compiled a memorandum with policy questions regarding 
access to the registry.129 Among the questions raised was the rank of 
police officers that could access the registry130 and questions regarding 
the possibility of notifying schools and community centers of a nearby 
residence of a sex offender in special cases.131 
The latest version of the proposal was submitted for an early 
reading in 2016.132 This last version would entrust the registry to the 
Courts Administration and declared it open to the public. Offenders 
willing to accept chemical treatment would be removed from the 
registry.133 The registry categories would include a physical 
description, the offender’s address, identification number and drivers’ 
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license number, a description of the offense, including the age and sex 
of the victim, and in special cases, the offender’s workplace address.134 
The proposal is still awaiting discussion by the Knesset. 
The conflict among policymakers over the power of the U.S. 
example—whether it is an argument for adopting the public registry 
simply because it is done in the United States, or for abandoning it 
because it is ineffective there—was reflected in litigation as well. In 
2012, the Haifa District Court heard a lawsuit in which a convicted sex 
offender who returned to reside in his kibbutz after release asked for 
an injunction against a TV channel that was going to broadcast a story 
about his crimes.135 Judge Ron Sokol found for the defendants, arguing 
that the newspaper articles about the plaintiff made his complaint 
about additional publicity moot; but he “found it appropriate to 
remark that the issue of publicizing identifying features about a sex 
offender who finished serving his sentence is a complicated question, 
which has not yet been answered in Israel.”136 The judge recounts the 
history of Megan’s Law legislation in the United States, offers an 
analysis of the public interest in publication, and then briefly 
summarizes the research that critiques open registries, citing an article 
by Dana Pugach, cofounder of the Noga Center.137 
The sex offender registry example is illustrative in several 
ways. First, it shows how law-and-order heyday policies tend to focus 
on the fact that a particular policy exists in the United States and are 
vaguer about how the policy fares in its country of origin. Second, it 
demonstrates that, in this period, legislators know that their proposals 
are (to them, unjustly) perceived as populistic. Third, and most 
importantly, it shows that even during the heyday of law and order, 
the extreme U.S. versions of victim advocacy were not uniformly 
embraced by Israeli policymakers. We see academic supporters and 
advocates for victims’ rights finding nuances, including support for 
victims whose opinions about the criminal process are nonpunitive.138 
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We see strong opposition by legal officials—not only the public 
defense and private attorneys, but government advisors—that 
extensively rely on critical research conducted in the United States. 
This opposition, fueled by policymakers educated in, and influenced 
by, U.S. academic institutions, is a counterintuitive “policy transfer”: 
the transfer of negative perspectives on U.S. policy via elite 
networking of academics and policymakers. The influence of this 
group of stakeholders on Israeli criminal justice would increase in the 
following decade, blooming into an “era of contention” and retreat 
from the United States as a role model. 
IV: THE ERA OF CONTENTION 
The declining infatuation with criminal justice in the United 
States is evident in four ways: First, there is a decline of fascination 
with U.S. law and order policies and a tendency to view the United 
States as more of a cautionary tale. As a consequence, both in 
committee hearings and in academic texts there is much reliance on 
the U.S. mass incarceration literature. The best example of this is the 
rejection of privatization of prisons, which rightly or unjustly, is 
perceived as contributing to the crisis. Second, and related, the United 
States-inspired reforms that get adopted are trends that the U.S. 
adopted to curb its incarceration appetite, such as community courts. 
Third, there is inspiration in anti-incarceration litigation, which can be 
seen in the recent successful case against prison overcrowding. The 
litigation techniques here are an impressive mix of United States-
inspired arguments and fresh new angles (square area per prisoner 
versus number of prisoners). Fourth, there is an increased appetite to 
look away from the U.S. and toward other countries, such as 
Scandinavian nations, as inspiration for policy, such as with 
prostitution. 
One example of the Israeli divestment from the U.S. example 
occurred in the course of the legislative project to introduce 
determinate sentencing. The original determinate sentencing bill from 
2006 included a proposal for establishing a committee that would set 
an “initial sentence” for each offense, akin to the limited ranges created 
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by sentencing commissions in many U.S. states and by the U.S. federal 
government.139 On December 5, 2011, the Knesset discussed a proposal 
by the Constitution, Legislation, and Law committee to sever the 
sentencing commission issue from the remainder of the bill. The 
Knesset approved the proposal and future versions of the bill did not 
include it.140 Judge Ami Kobo, in recounting the history of the law, 
explained that “this part provoked the lion share of critique of the bill, 
as critics argued that ‘initial sentences’ would narrow judicial 
discretion in sentencing, contradict the principle of individualized 
punishment, and shift[] the decision-making power away from the 
courts and toward plea bargaining negotiation.”141 Notably, these 
concerns were compounded by the concern that “initial sentences” 
would lead to “improper ‘punishment tariffs’, and simultaneously to 
a considerable and improper increase in sentencing severity as with 
the sentencing guidelines in the United States.”142 
In lieu of “initial sentences,” the final bill143 left sentencing 
discretion in the hands of the judge, but required judges to justify the 
imposed sentence using the following structure: first, the judge would 
establish the “appropriate range” of sentencing based on a retributivist 
logic; then, he or she would consider whether it is appropriate to 
depart from this range for rehabilitation reasons (downwards) or for 
protecting the public (upwards); if such departures were not available, 
the judge would then justify the length of the sentence within the 
appropriate range; and finally, situations involving multiple offenses 
or offenders would be considered. The limitations on judicial decision 
making in each of these steps were fairly minimal; a “public 
protection” upward departure from the self-imposed “appropriate 
range” would require a showing of the defendant’s considerable 
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criminal history, or other criteria as set up in a professional report 
(which could include the probation report). 
This watered-down version of determinate sentencing is a 
clear departure from the various types of determinate sentencing 
adopted in the United States in the late 1970s and 1980s. Much of the 
U.S. literature on determinate sentencing describes it as the outcome 
of a bipartisan push, a description that dovetails with recent literature 
highlighting the share of liberals and professionals in mass 
incarceration144. But at least in California, the bill generated 
considerable—and prescient—opposition from the left and even from 
within the system. Numerous organizations predicted that 
determinate sentencing would lead to harsher sentencing across the 
board, and submitted letters to Governor Jerry Brown, then on his first 
term, urging him not to sign these changes into law. Some examples of 
prescient commentators include California Attorneys for Criminal 
Justice (“[t]he inescapable reality of this change is the absolute 
certainty of never-ending effort to increase terms”)145 and the ACLU 
of Northern California (“sentence escalation will become a popular 
legislative pastime”).146 Indeed, the proponents and opponents of the 
Determinate Sentencing Act reflected a dichotomy between politicians 
and prosecutors, elected officials who felt accountable and vulnerable 
to the public on public safety matters, and professional parole officers, 
therapeutic professionals, and other employees in the gigantic 
California rehabilitation machine, who until then could toil in relative 
obscurity and opaqueness, relying on their professional legitimacy and 
immunity from critique. In the United States, the shift toward 
determinate sentencing represented a triumph of the political-
emotional paradigm over the professionalized one; the Israeli version 
represents a conscious decision not to go that far. 
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Another successful marshalling of the U.S. experience as a 
cautionary tale was the failed effort to introduce prison privatization. 
Talks on prison privatization in Israel started in the early 2000s, 
already prompting critique and warnings from academics and civil 
rights organizations. Political scientist Yoav Peled invoked the 
American experience as a cautionary tale pointing out that “serious 
studies” conducted in the United States concluded that “there is no 
proof that prison privatization yields significant savings for the 
state.”147 He also mentions that “in the United States, the sentencing 
increase that led to the doubling of the number of prisoners between 
the mid-80s and the mid-90s was partly the outcome of overt lobbying 
efforts by private prison companies” and that “in the United States, in 
many cases it has been heard that the prison authorities took 
unjustified disciplinary measures against inmates to prevent the 
opportunity for their early release for good behavior.”148 
However, the Interior Committee meeting that yielded the 
initial bill was full of praise for the United States experience. Shmuel 
Hershkovitz, Director of the Internal Security Ministry, said,  
I personally visited two prisons in the United States, 
and I have to say that if that’s a prison, I don’t know 
what a prison means. They weren’t putting on a show 
for me, because I toured there alone with the staff. The 
impression is that it’s an approach that focuses on 
preserving the dignity of the prisoner and saving the 
state’s budget.149  
Knesset Member Hemi Doron was less optimistic: “We can see 
lots of journalistic articles and exposés about horrible things that 
happen in private prisons in the United States.”150 Aviv Vasserman, an 
attorney working civil rights cases at a legal clinic, was incensed:  
 
147 Yoav Peled, Crime Pays: What Can Be Learned from the American Experience in 
Prison Privatization, ADVA CENTER FOR EQUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2001, http://
www.adva.org/ivrit/prisonsPrivatization.htm. 
148 Id. 
149 Protocol. No. 118 of the Meeting of the Interior and Environmental Committee, 
Dec. 29, 2003, 3-4. 
150 Id. at 7. 
348 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 28 
There are papers by the American Department of 
Justice and leading research institutions in the United 
States which wrote in 1999, after 15 years of experience 
in the field, that this business doesn’t save the state 
costs, it brings about a decline in the quality of guards, 
both in terms of personal quality and of salaries, and it 
leads to more turnover among the staff.151 
It is telling that the discussion then turned to the question of 
differentiating the Israeli proposal from the U.S. model. Herzl Yusuv 
said,  
everyone is talking about the American model, in 
America, as in America, they always go to the extreme 
and we’re not there at all. We know the American 
model, it is much broader, gives broad authority to the 
contractor, and we need the British model that 
incorporates strict state supervision of what happens 
in the prison.152 
Judge Telgam responds, “the American study is a comparative 
work of dozens of studies that were conducted, and it provides the 
Comparison.”153 Yusuv replies, “I studied the American model. 
Everyone who argued that the shift was justified, they claimed he 
represented the private corporations. Everyone who argued against it, 
they claimed he was ideologically motivated.”154 
In 2004, the full Knesset was presented with a bill to allow 
privatization of prisons.155 The Knesset assembly to discuss the bill 
was extremely contentious. KM Muhammad Barakah of the left-wing 
party Hadash argued that “some things cannot be subject to 
competition and capitalization.”156 Avraham “Bayga” Shohat objects: 
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“[Then] why is it good in England? I saw it in England.”157 Zahava 
Gal’on retorts: “The fact that you saw this in England doesn’t mean it 
works. I’m going to say something in a minute about the British and 
the Americans.”158 
She proceeds: 
There is prison privatization in England and prison 
privatization in the United States. But despite this 
popularity . . . no country has been able to establish 
whether privatization was a good idea. And why they 
haven’t been able to establish—and th[ese] are things I 
read from experts on the subject—is because there is a 
very, very big difficulty in isolating and critiquing the 
many variables that influence the economic and social 
outcomes involved in such privatization . . . it is not at 
all clear . . . in the United States whether prison 
privatization led, in the long run, to considerable 
savings for the state.159 
She proceeds to explicitly repudiate the American reliance on 
prison privatization: 
In the United States the private prison industry has 
been operating for the last 20 years. Because of their 
lobbying, which aims to guarantee them a steady 
supply of inmates—I want the Knesset to know this—
in California today minors are serving life without 
parole for stealing a hat or a videotape, in an adult 
facility. 
So I suggest we don’t deceive ourselves. First you 
introduce private companies and allow them to 
operate private prisons . . . and later we’ll find 
ourselves standing here in the Knesset an[d] asking 
how we caused this. We privatized prisons, because 
there’s a cost benefit thing and the country is in 
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financial distress, but what’s going to happen in the 
end? Who is going to be put in there? Will they now 
put minors who stole a videotape into a prison with 
adults? Is that the situation we want to bring about? 
. . . 
Another thing I want to bring to the Knesset’s 
attention: Even though officially the Internal Security 
Office, who appeared before the committee, refused to 
disclose the details on the American companies that 
are in the running [to operate the private prisons], in a 
journalistic interview two of the three companies were 
exposed. I want you to know that these corporations 
have a history with the prisons they operate in the 
United States . . . there have been massive rape cases 
within prisons, both for female inmates and for female 
guards, in the same prisons they run; there’s been a 
mass escape of 500 inmates from one prison; and they 
established prisons that were regarded drug dens. 
Suddenly this has become much worse. We have here 
prisons that the state runs. I haven’t heard . . . and I 
hope I won’t hear of such cases of rape of inmates, of 
guards, in prisons.160 
Despite these efforts, the amendment passed.161 The new law 
drew ire from civil rights organizations, which sued the Ministry of 
Justice. Their attorney, Effi Michaeli of the Israel institute of 
Democracy, pointed out that the new law was “a meaningful step 
reflecting a right-wing economic policy.”162 He, too, expressed 
concerns about the inappropriateness of correctional authorities for 
privatization. Importantly, he points out that  
many studies in the Western world reflect harsh 
phenomena of rights violations of inmates held in 
private prisons around the world, because of lack of 
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capabilities of the private profiteer’s employees, their 
lack of experience, and the economic considerations 
that accompany the decision making of the authority 
that operates the privatized prison.163  
Similarly pessimistic was journalist Arye Dayan, who 
extensively invoked the negative experiences in the United States,164 
and attorney Aviv Vasserman, who wrote for Yediot Aharonot:  
Even assuming that full privatization is a reasonable 
solution, the Israeli bill allows for all the familiar 
problems from the similar move in the United States. 
It enables, not to say incentivizes, the negative 
phenomena that were found in the international 
experience, and to the extent that any caveats were 
accepted they were marginal.165 
On November 19th, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled not to 
allow the private prisons to operate.166 The Court relied on 
constitutional arguments, finding that the amendment violated the 
freedom of movement, guaranteed in Article Five of Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Freedom.167 The decision reflects a quasi-
European sensibility for rights discourse, which was absent from the 
U.S. policymaking debate about prison privatization. Importantly, the 
effort to present the court with policy evaluation studies from the 
United States failed. Chief Justice Beinisch found that “even though 
concerns raised by petitioners are not baseless, they concern a future 
human rights violation, the potential of which is uncertain; and 
therefore it is doubtful whether it can serve as constitutional 
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foundation for striking down a Knesset law.”168 More specifically, the 
Chief Justice observed that  
the petitioners’ argument about the impact of prison 
privatization in other countries (and especially in the 
United States) is insufficient for an apriori decisive 
finding of this court, according to which the mode of 
operating prisons through private management will 
necessarily lead to a more significant violation of 
human rights than in public prisons . . . partly because 
the legislative arrangement in Israel differs from those 
in other countries . . . and partly because the 
comparative data itself is indecisive.169  
By contrast, the decision relies on the notion that the very 
transfer of correctional power from the state to private hands is a 
violation of basic state obligations, and in so deciding, the Court relies 
on U.S. scholarship, particularly on John DiIulio’s assertion that “It is 
not unreasonable to suggest that employing the force of the 
Community via private penal management undermines the moral writ 
of the community itself.”170 But this is philosophical scholarship about 
the nature of privatization, and the Court is careful to point out that 
“American courts have not established, so far, which of the different 
legislative agreements in the United States that pertain to prison 
privatization is unconstitutional”171 even though privatization itself is 
“hotly debated.”172 
The Minister of Treasury, Yuval Steinitz, aggressively 
criticized the decision at the Israel Business Convention, arguing that 
the Court exhibited “budgetary abandon.”173 But he found himself 
almost singlehandedly attacking the decision. The Ministry of Justice 
was not required to respond and even Netanyahu, in meeting Chief 
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Justice Beinisch, repudiated Steinitz’s critique.174 Pinhas Rubin, a 
business lawyer writing for the business newspaper Globes, said that  
this is appropriate for a country that seeks basic rights 
. . . in the competition between the budget and 
fundamental freedoms, the freedoms prevailed, and 
their violation was found to be disproportionate and 
unconstitutional. This is the enlightened governance 
we chose and wanted to live in.175  
Steinitz’s critiques pointed out that the state, which explicitly 
asked the Court not to issue a temporary injunction, took a risk by 
allowing the private company to build the first prison on speculation, 
and was therefore liable for the outcome.176 
The Knesset committee meeting to discuss the ramifications of 
the Court decision was heavily protested by the employees hired by 
the private contractor, who had left their places of employment to join 
the new venture. The contractor himself attended the meeting, 
expressing bitterness that “the Supreme Court murdered my dream 
for prisoner rehabilitation . . . this prison had adopted as its motto the 
issue of prisoner rehabilitation.” He also reportedly asked “why does 
this system succeed in most prisons in the world and in Israel it is 
thought that it will fail.”177 Eventually, the Prison Service purchased 
the private prison from the entrepreneur and started operating it in 
2010.178F178 
Another development repudiating the U.S. legacy of 
incarceration was the 2015 report by the Dorner Commission on 
Punishment Policy and Offender Treatment, which, ironically, was 
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convened because of public outcry about the leniency of sentences.179 
Established by Minister of Justice Ya’acov Ne’eman and chaired by 
retired Supreme Court Justice Dalia Dorner, the Commission was 
comprised of a variety of professional stakeholders: representatives of 
the prosecution, defense, correctional authorities, police, and several 
academics. Several of the participants—academics Oren Gazal-Ayal 
and Kenneth Mann and public defender Yoav Sapir—attended 
graduate school in the United States. Another key participant, deputy 
public defender Hagit Lernau, an experienced academic and 
policymaker, had written a criminology textbook titled Crime and Law 
Enforcement,180F180 which devoted an entire section to the United States 
mass incarceration crisis, not only because of its centrality to the 
penological literature, but because she saw it as an important 
cautionary tale for Israeli lawmakers, professionals, and policymakers. 
The story told by the Dorner Commission echoed the story told 
by the National Research Council (“NRC”) commission of 2014.181 The 
Dorner commission was not exactly the Israeli counterpart of the NRC 
committee, which was comprised of academics piecing together the 
history of mass incarceration. The conclusions, however, were 
remarkably similar. Committee Chair Jeremy Travis expressed 
concern that “the United States is past the point where the number of 
people in prison can be justified by social benefits” and urged to 
consider “a criminal justice system that makes less use of incarceration’ 
and more use of “common sense, practical steps . . . in that 
direction.”182 The committee report recommended reexamining 
mandatory and long-term sentences, at both the federal and state 
levels, and a reconsideration of the punitive war on drugs. The reform 
principles recommended by the NRC report were very similar to the 
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Dorner commission’s recommendations: Chief among the sentencing 
considerations would be proportionality, supported by parsimony 
(the minimal sentence necessary to achieve sentencing goals), 
citizenship (leaving an opening to restore one’s civic status) and social 
justice (equity and fairness in punishment.)183 The report highlighted 
the uneven distribution of incarceration, and its adverse impact on 
already disadvantaged communities. 
Even though the Dorner commission report does not cite the 
NRC report, its recommendations are remarkably similar. As its chief 
recommendation, it touts a principle of proportionality between 
severity and punishment and finds that “increasing the statutory 
penalties does not advance the war on crime and in general is not 
recommended as a means for that end.”184 But importantly, from the 
onset, the report singles out the U.S. correctional project as an example 
of poor implementation of retributive philosophy: “While modern 
retributivist theory . . . supported much more lenient sentencing than 
existing ones, its application in the United States, and to a great extent 
in other common law countries, led to an increase in sentencing 
severity.”185 The report proceeds to compare the rise in incarceration 
rates in the United States and in Israel, finding a similar pattern of 
exponential growth, albeit on different scales. 
The Dorner report excoriates some of the main features of 
punishment severity in the United States and urges the Israeli 
legislature not to follow in their path. In doing so, the report heavily 
relies on U.S. literature critical of the punitive turn. Accordingly, the 
report relies on behavioral literature to critique deterrence, insofar as 
it serves as a rationale for harsher sentencing, opting instead for 
improving apprehension odds.186 The report also relies on situational 
crime prevention—the works of Weisburd and others in U.S. 
settings—to suggest that prevention is more effective than 
punishment.187 A particularly interesting aspect of the report is its 
revision of Robert Martinson’s classic article concluding that “nothing 
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works” in prison rehabilitation. Relying on newer research conducted 
in U.S. settings, the Dorner report concludes that some evidence-based 
programs work, and more importantly—that effective rehabilitation 
can be achieved in community settings as well as in correctional 
ones.188 
Another interesting feature of the Dorner commission was its 
recommendation to support and implement one particular U.S. 
innovation: community courts.189 The report recommended 
expanding the pilot program for such courts by picking appropriate 
judges and establishing a case management system that would 
consistently refer cases to these unique courts. The special courts were 
pioneered by Joint-Ashalim, a public-private collaboration between 
the Israeli government, the Joint Israel nonprofit, and the New York 
Jewish Federation.190 Daniella Beinisch, an academic-turned-
policymaker, wrote her doctoral dissertation about U.S. problem-
solving courts and brought those insights to Joint-Ashalim. In 2014, 
two courts were established, in Ramla and Be’er Sheva, and in 2016, 
the government decided to expand the program and inaugurate two 
more. Other Israeli scholars interested in problem-solving courts, Tali 
Gal and Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg, learned about them by conducting 
a taxonomy of U.S. courts.191 
The Dorner report also discussed the pathologies of mass 
incarceration, such as its criminogenic effects and the threat to basic 
dignity. As an example, the report cites Brown v. Plata, arguing that 
“the rise of the prison population required confining them in 
overcrowded, difficult conditions. As a consequence, the United States 
Supreme Court found the correctional system unconstitutional and 
ordered the release of 46,000 prisoners.”192 
This part of the report was not unrelated to developments in 
Israel. In 2014, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) 
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petitioned the High Court of Justice to alleviate the overcrowding in 
Israeli prisons.193 The overcrowding issue had been mentioned before, 
in committees formed in the late 1970s and 1980s, and was frequently 
brought to public attention through the Public Defender’s annual 
reports. Particularly notable was the 2013 Public Defender’s report, 
devoted to the issue of overcrowding,194 which stated that Israel 
accorded each inmate approximately 3 square meters of living space, 
contrasted with an average of 8.8. meters in western countries. Page 4 
of the report offers numerous comparators and depicts Israel as an 
outlier, but notably does not list the United States among the western 
countries.195 The same trend repeats itself when measuring number of 
inmates per cell.196 
The report’s divergence from the U.S. path is evident not only 
from its choice of comparative role models, but also from its choice of 
the unit of measurement for overcrowding. The Plata litigation 
addressed the overall number of prisoners in the correctional system 
compared to the system’s design capacity, and the resulting order 
required the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
to release enough inmates to achieve a 137.5% occupancy.197 By 
contrast, the Israeli measure, used in other European countries, 
assesses overcrowding using square meterage per inmate or number 
of inmates per cell. This measure is, arguably, a much better indicator 
of the conditions of incarceration and their immediate impact on the 
inmates’ quality of life. Indeed, in December 2017, Nick Jones 
calculated the occupancy in California prisons in the supposedly Plata-
compliant era. He found no less than 15 state prisons were still 
overcrowded, because the Plata measures pertained to the system as a 
whole, rather than to individual institutions.198 Measuring 
overcrowding by territory has the additional advantage of enabling 
comparisons between inmates in different institutions; indeed, as the 
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statement of facts by the Court explains, while a minority of inmates 
enjoyed 4.5 square meters, most of them were housed under much 
more crowded conditions, with more than 40 percent of inmates living 
in less than three meters per person. Another advantage of this 
measurement is that it allows for a discussion of each inmate’s 
territorial share in common areas, such as bathrooms and showers—
notably, in Plata, the calculation method obfuscated the fact that many 
of these inmates were housed in triple bunks in formerly public areas 
of the prison, such as the San Quentin gym.199 
The petition was colored, from its inception, by the state’s 
efforts to avoid a court mandate. The correspondence between the 
parties reflects multiple reports arguing that the prison authority was 
in the process of constructing prisons, and the petitioners’ replies that 
these long-term administrative promises were inadequate as solutions 
for the immediate problem.200 While the decision itself refers to the 
challenge to dignity in the abstract, one of the petitioners’ lawyers, 
Sigal Shahav, coordinator of the criminal justice clinic at the Academic 
Center for Law and Business in Ramat Gan, illustrated the problems 
in an article for Ha’aretz following the decision:  
Such overcrowding increases the conflict between the 
prisoners and the violence and illness in the prison. 
These difficult conditions compound other problems: 
old, decrepit structures, some of them with serious 
moisture problems; lack of proper ventilation causing 
extreme temperature; in some correctional institutions 
the showers are located above crouching bathrooms, 
and sometimes the bathrooms and showers are 
separated from the cell by a mere curtain; because of 
the poor hygiene conditions there is a pest problem 
that hurts the prisoners.201 
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An example of the shifting inspiration sources can be found in 
a story in Ha’aretz newspaper from 2017, which reports of a Belgian 
method for reducing overcrowding: Belgian inmates alternate 
between a week in prison and a week at home, enabling two inmates 
to “occupy” one bed by rotation.202 
The decision in the overcrowding case led to a legislative 
release valve. The Prison Ordinance had already been amended in 
1993 to create a release valve during overcrowded periods.203 The Act 
to Amend the Prison Ordinance [Temporary] 2018 created an 
additional mechanism for shortening prison sentences, in the event 
that overcrowding persists despite the valve. The new amendment 
categorized prisoners by the length of their sentences, stating an 
incarceration term for each category.204 As the Act was being 
proposed, a uniquely Israeli wrinkle unfolded: A story in Ha’aretz 
newspaper alerted the public to the fact that the new early release 
regime would set free 300 “security prisoners” – Palestinians convicted 
of terrorist acts.205 As a consequence, the bill was amended, and the 
final excluded people incarcerated for terrorist acts.206 
As with the Plata litigation, the prison overcrowding decision 
met compliance challenges at the prison level. In August 2018, 
Ha’aretz reported that prisoners at Ma’asiahu prison complained that 
nothing in their incarceration conditions had changed after the 
decision, and that their efforts to sue the state for the violations were 
met with retaliation and sabotage by prison personnel.207 The state’s 
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lack of compliance with the timetable set by the Court was the source 
of additional litigation. Moreover, ACRI continued to press the state, 
through the courts, about the implementation of the decision on so-
called “security prisoners”, leading to a set of specialized solutions for 
this inmate population.208 
The prison overcrowding litigation represents a mature and 
complicated approach toward the U.S. example. First, it reflects 
reliance on the American correctional landscape as a cautionary tale 
rather than an inspiration. At the same time, it represents a 
sophisticated approach toward U.S. civil rights litigation, adopting 
some important tactics such as prison documentation and 
international comparison and rejecting others, such as the measuring 
unit for overcrowding. It also reflects the increasing reliance on 
university clinics—a model of legal education adapted from U.S. 
schools—as important hubs of civil rights litigation. And finally, it 
reflects a healthy interest in locating alternative role models and 
sources of penological inspiration. 
This last issue is evident in another example from the era of 
contention—the Act for Prohibition of Prostitution Consumption.209 
The law created an administrative offense, Consuming Prostitution, 
punishable by a considerable fine.210 The Act modified  legal status of 
sex work in Israel: the Penal Code never explicitly prohibited 
prostitution in itself, but it did criminally proscribe “keeping a place 
for the purpose of prostitution.”211 The original purpose behind the 
offense was to target pimps and exploiters of sex workers, while 
leaving the sex workers themselves out of the criminalization 
framework; indeed, Supreme Court decisions from the 1990s 
instructed lower courts to interpret the offense according to the social 
purpose of eradicating the pimping phenomenon.212 But the 
 
208 ACRI, Overcrowding in Prison and Arrest Facilities in Israel—Update, August 8, 
2008. 
209 Prohibition on Prostitution Consumption Law (Temporary Order and Legislative 
Amendment), 5779-2019, HH No. 1258 p. 58 (Isr.). 
210 Id. at ¶ 4. 
211 Penal Law, 5737-1977 sec. 204 (Isr.). 
212 Criminal Appeal 2249/92 Hertzl Gavison v. the State of Israel, available on Takdin, 
https://www.takdin.co.il/searchg/%D7%A2%20%D7%A4%202249%2092%20%D7
%94%D7%A8%D7%A6%D7%9C%20%D7%92%D7%91%D7%99%D7%96%D7
2021 BAD ROLE MODELS 361 
unintended consequence of the offense was the frequent 
criminalization of sex workers who worked from home.213 Ironically, 
more sex workers were charged under the law that was meant to 
protect them than pimps214, perversely incentivizing sex workers who 
hoped to avoid prosecution to work in the unprotected streets. 
But even this poorly designed legal arrangement was better 
than its U.S. counterparts, which criminalize both sides of the sex work 
transaction in all states but one.215 In Nevada, ten counties legalize 
prostitution if conducted in a “licensed house of prostitution.”216 All 
other states place the sex workers themselves under threat of 
incarceration, with the possibility of more severe sentencing for repeat 
offenders.217 
The Israeli proposal explicitly rejected this aspect of the U.S. 
model, affirming its commitment to the view that sex workers were 
exploited, vulnerable victims, rather than criminal perpetrators. 
Following the Nordic Model,218 the Israeli law explicitly targets clients 
of sex workers, including recipients of “lap dances” at strip joints, and 
in the future is designed to offer an educational alternative to the fine 
in the form of a “John school” equivalent (a privately provided 
workshop for sex work consumers already operates in Israel.)219 
Importantly, the Swedish model is not clean of doubts. Naomi 
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critics, points out that Sweden actively promotes client criminalization 
around the world and appointed a special consul for this purpose.220 
She also explains that the Swedish police not only arrest clients, but 
also notify landlords about sex work occurring in their home, with the 
unfortunate consequence of eviction or increased rent for the sex 
workers themselves, who continue to provide sex services under more 
vulnerable conditions.221 Levenkron expresses doubts about the 
powers of a criminal sanction in the face of “the simple fact that men 
continue to rape, murder, and sexually harass regardless of the 
existence of legal prohibition.”222 She finds irony in that  
at a time in which feminism has liberated itself from 
the burden of law, excoriated the legal system, and 
turned to lynching rapists and harassers in the 
Facebook town square, it finds it appropriate to subject 
the women it regards as most vulnerable in society to 
a system it regards as patriarchal, oppressive, and 
discriminatory.223  
Levenkron’s important critique notwithstanding, it seems that 
the social ills she identifies would be considerably worsened by 
adopting the U.S. model, which criminalizes the sex workers 
themselves. 
This last point is generalizable to much of the criminal justice 
reform characterizing the Era of Contention. The Israeli solutions to 
problems such as sentencing disparities, prison overcrowding, and sex 
work, are not ideal, but they represent a clear trend of departure from 
blindly following United States reforms. U.S. criminal justice policy is 
either clearly rejected or adopted and then departed from. When U.S. 
criminal justice inspires, it is often in its adoption of alternative or 
dissenting ideas, such as community courts, john schools, and prisoner 
rights litigation. This recent trend of awakening calls for a broader 
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inquiry into the similarities between the two countries, which might 
explain why it has come so late in the process. 
As with the heyday of law and order, the era of contention 
reflects a policy transfer via both emulation and elite networking. Both 
the punitive proposals and their nonpunitive alternatives are 
emulations of trends existing in the United States, which is not 
uniformly punitive: community courts and sex worker customer 
reeducation exist side by side with private incarceration and 
mandatory minimums. Moreover, supporters and opponents of 
punitive policies alike appeal to their familiarity with the U.S. system, 
either by explicitly mentioning visits to the United States or by 
signaling familiarity through the comparative materials cited. 
A remarkable aspect of the Era of Contention is the increasing 
influence of U.S.-educated academics on local controversies about 
policymaking. It is impossible to overestimate the impact of American 
legal education, particularly in the areas of critical legal studies, law 
and society, and critical writings about penology, on the Israeli 
academic scene. As mentioned above, Pnina Lahav identifies several 
stages in the “Americanization” of Israeli academe,224 culminating in 
its “peak” from 2008 onward—the advent of the “era of contention.” 
Unsurprisingly, the arguments made by opponents of punitive U.S. 
policies echo American scholarship, and come from empirical legal 
studies, behavioral economics, critical legal studies involving gender 
and race, and the fields of law. What is especially interesting about 
Israelis returning from studying abroad is that not all join academia, 
and many of the people educated in the United States return to Israel 
to assume senior positions in government and policymaking, at the 
Ministry of Justice, the National Public Defender’s office, and various 
clinical centers at the heart of litigation. Far from simplistically 
representing the end of the United States “policy transfer” moment, 
this era reflects a complicated relationship with U.S. criminal justice, 
in which Israeli elite networking that acts against adopting U.S. 
policies is in itself the product of American critique of the same policies 
in their country of origin. 
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V: SIBLINGS IN DEVELOPMENT 
A. Applying U.S. Political Development to Criminal 
Justice 
What can the two models of policy transfer teach us about the 
United States, Israel, and their interrelationship? The most important 
thing is that “criminal justice policy” is not a monolith, and that 
tendencies to adopt U.S. policies, as well as conscious decisions to 
deviate from them, are both done in reference to the United States. 
Different stakeholders in Israel have different ways of relating to U.S. 
policies: lawmakers seeking legitimacy and public support rely on 
American-inspired rhetoric devices, such as a claim of rising crime and 
danger to the public, whereas elite professionals, such as U.S.-
educated criminal justice academics and senior policymakers, tend to 
glom onto the critical writing in the United States to oppose the 
adoption of unhealthy policies. 
But why the United States, of all places? The answer might lie 
in the literature problematizing the perception of the United States as 
a developing country in the context of criminal justice. In the Slate 
magazine column “If It Happened There”, Joshua Keating narrates 
current events in U.S. politics using the journalistic style usually 
associated with reporting events in foreign countries. Here, for 
example, is Keating’s rewriting of the firing of James Comey: 
The surprise dismissal of a powerful security services 
chief Tuesday night is widely seen here as a part of 
strongman President Donald Trump’s efforts to 
sideline critics and consolidate power, raising concerns 
about the state of democracy and the rule of law in this 
fragile but strategically vital North American country. 
. . . 
Still rated “Free” by the nongovernmental monitoring 
organization Freedom House, the United States is 
fiercely proud of its democratic tradition and the 
independence of its judiciary. When Trump, an 
ultranationalist former oligarch who has in the past 
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questioned the motives of judges who rule against 
him, took power in January, many experts feared his 
tenure could erode the influence and independence of 
America’s democratic institutions. So far, most of those 
fears have not come to pass, as some of Trump’s most 
controversial initiatives have been blocked by the 
judiciary and the legislature. But a key legislative 
victory early this month—rolling back most of the 
previous regime’s health care initiatives—as well as 
this latest purge have reignited concerns among 
opposition leaders that the country’s weakened 
institutions may not be enough to rein in Trump’s 
ambitions.225 
The humorous effect of Keating’s column comes from the fact 
that the author describes a country that self-identifies as a first world, 
developed international leader, using the paternalistic, quasi-
anthropological language usually used by first-world reporters to 
describe developing countries. But the outcome is thought provoking: 
Is there a real qualitative difference between United States politics and 
those of developing countries? 
In the last three decades, American Political Development 
(APD), a subdiscipline of political science, has employed qualitative 
methods to examine the historical development of American politics. 
Rogan Kersh defines the discipline as follows: 
APD focuses on the causes, nature, and consequences 
of key transformative periods and central patterns in 
American political history. More than other political 
scientists, APD scholars look to historical processes to 
analyze governing structures and policy outcomes, 
and to build theories about political change. More than 
most historians, APD analysts draw on evidence from 
the past to illuminate broad questions about today’s 
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U.S. polity and its idiosyncratic institutional features. 
APD researchers may also be distinguished from most 
historians by their willingness to advance 
comprehensive theories about American institutions, 
particularly the national state, and about 
governance.226 
Some of the questions that APD scholars are interested in 
pertain to some sociopolitical aspects of life in the United States which, 
compared to other developed nations, seem to lag behind. For 
example, John Skrentny’s The Minority Rights Revolution227 examines 
the 1970s efforts toward racial equality in light of previous events, such 
as the aftermath of World War II and the Iron Curtain. Similarly, Paul 
Frymer’s Black and Blue228 and Karen Orren’s Belated Feudalism229 both 
discuss the historical and political causes for the weakness of the U.S. 
labor movement. Frymer shows a policy of “divide and conquer” 
between racial rights and labor rights, and Orren shows a disconnect 
between labor governance and democratic politics. But the APD 
engagement with issues of class and race has, so far, failed to 
encompass issues related to the criminal justice system, which has 
heavy implications for the failure to achieve class and racial equality. 
In his keynote address at a Boston University symposium, 
Malcolm Feeley sought to harness insights from APD to understand 
criminal justice.230 As Feeley argues, APD tends to rely on explanations 
of fragmentation and “weak state” to explain U.S. failures of creating 
a robust and functioning welfare policy. Applying these insights to the 
criminal justice area requires some modification. Feeley argues that, 
throughout its history, American criminal justice policy has been 
consistently described as failing to achieve its goals, but largely so 
because it has been compared to industrialized Western nations, 
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particularly Western European countries, and specifically Nordic 
countries.231 These countries are typically regarded as “developed 
countries,” or the “global North”, and contrasted to “developing 
countries” or “the global South”, which are characterized by political 
instability, high level of interpersonal violence, wide gaps in income, 
and painful histories of slavery and racial oppression.232 Feeley’s 
unflinching gaze on the two categories of countries leads him to 
conclude that “by many of the indicators I have set out above, the 
United States is ranked well below Western Europe, and toward the 
Latin American end of the spectrum.”233 
While valuable as a rhetorical statement, Feeley’s observation 
is also valuable as offering an explanatory tool. The many failures of 
criminal justice reform in the United States—police violence, 
courtroom dynamics, the bail system, and the sentencing system—are 
easier to understand when drawing analogies to South American and 
other developing countries who suffer from similar problems. The 
source of the criminal justice system’s resistance to reform can only be 
found if we  
dig deeper and seek to understand [it] in light of the 
culture and governmental structure. No serious 
diagnosis of the problems of education, public health, 
and criminal justice administration in developing 
countries occurs without its being anchored in an 
appreciation for the weaknesses in governmental 
structures. Similarly, too, I suggest, diagnosis of the 
obstacles in the American criminal process must be 
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anchored in a broader understanding of the failures of 
public administration and governmental structures.234 
B. Israel and the United States. as sibling developing 
countries 
Feeley’s striking observation has important implications 
beyond U.S. criminal justice. There is an established body of 
scholarship that analyzes Israeli law in general, and Israeli criminal 
justice in particular, as products of Israel’s political development and 
colonial legacy. In Argonauts of the Eastern Mediterranean,235 Asaf 
Likhovski marshals historical examples to show how Israeli adoption 
of foreign policies was not merely a rational examination of the 
advantages of comparative legal structures, but also an act carrying a 
considerable symbolic load. Relying on Eric Posner’s ideas about 
norms as a form of signaling and on David Nelken’s ideas about 
adopting foreign norms as tokens of willingness to cooperate 
internationally, Likhovski explains two policy decisions—the Israel-
Harvard project of the 1950s and the Israeli aid to Africa in the 1960s—
as efforts to alleviate the “anxiety of influence” related to Israeli law, 
which in the 1950s was an amalgam of Islamic, Frenchh, and English 
norms and institutions. But the remedy for this eclecticism was even 
more eclecticism—seeking “the most advanced [legal] thought and 
best [legal] experience wherever it may be found.”236 This comparative 
approach made Israel appear cosmopolitan and dressed up its 
eclecticism as forward-thinking originality and openness to 
considering (albeit not blindly accepting) models from other countries. 
Likhovski explains that Israel’s heterogeneous legal mosaic was 
perceived by commentators as reflecting Israel’s social and ethnic 
complexity. In the area of criminal law in particular, Likhovski quotes 
Israeli Supreme Court Judge Haim Cohn, who claimed that the new 
penal code “[would]  be one of the contributions, however modest and 
ineffectual they may seem to be, to the progress of mankind under the 
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rule of law.”237 Israel’s reliance on foreign influence was, thus, a way 
to portray Israel as part of the civilized world and refashion its legal 
eclecticism into a powerful display of advanced policymaking. 
As Likhovski argues, the project of adopting and signaling a 
cosmopolitan perspective cannot be divorced from Israel’s 
geographical location and its colonial history. And, indeed, as 
Alexandre Kedar explains, the study of comparative law cannot be 
divorced from the legacy of colonialism and from the spatial, 
geographical dimension.238 Israel’s identity as a former colony (a 
developing “learner”) is embedded in its legal DNA. Yael Berda 
identifies the roots of its ostensibly modern surveillance routine in 
British colonial practices.239 Mitra Sharafi identifies the roots of its 
lawyering profession, like those of the other British colonies, in the 
history of the British metropole.240 Various statutory practices in Israel, 
in areas as diverse as corporations,241 tax,242 and water law,243 are 
embedded in its colonial history, as is its entire property law structure, 
which hails back to its days as an Ottoman colony.244 Even its 
constitutional structure (Israel’s “basic laws”) evinces deep colonial 
influences.245 Specifically in the context of criminal justice, Binyamin 
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Blum, Yoram Rabin and Barak Ariel identify deep British influences 
on Israel’s procedure for admitting confessions into evidence,246 
despite the 1995 shift to a German-influenced criminal code. 
If we accept this extension of Feeley’s thesis—namely, that 
Israel, not only the United States, is a developing country from a 
criminal justice perspective—a possible explanation why U.S. 
correctional policy has been seductive and interesting to Israel might 
rely on their similarities as developing countries. Looking at both 
countries through the lens of development theory highlights several 
relevant similarities. First, both countries have a strong legacy of ethnic 
and racial conflict, which impacts the composition of the population 
subjected to criminal justice control. Second, both countries are 
characterized by high levels of interpersonal violence and, relatedly, a 
high concentration of guns. In the United States, gun ownership is the 
outcome of both illegal purchase and permissive gun laws,247 and in 
Israel, guns circulating in civilian hands are related to the wide 
access—legal and illegal—to military weaponry even in civilian 
spaces.248 In both countries, fetishization of protectionism and 
aggressive bravery plays into the culture of interpersonal violence. 
Third, both countries are characterized by unusual levels of police 
overreach and brutality,249 far beyond their Western industrialized 
counterparts. And fourth, both countries rank considerably higher 
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than other Western industrialized countries in perception of political 
corruption—in 2018, the United States at 22 and Israel at 34.250 
The context in which these characteristics arise is, of course, 
different for the two countries. The United States has a long and 
difficult legacy of slavery;251 whereas in Israel the ethnic conflict stems 
from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Occupation,252 as well as 
from ethnic and religious tensions within the Jewish population.253 
Moreover, gun ownership has a very different cultural significance in 
the two countries, though they both share fear and concern about guns 
ending up in inappropriate hands. And the differences in scale matter 
a great deal; it has often been said that “American criminal justice” is 
not a monolith, as there is considerable difference among state criminal 
justice policies.254 Still, on a national scale, the cultural comparisons are 
striking. The trend of comparison is especially evident when 
comparing the Netanyahu and Trump administrations’ positions on 
“crimmigration,” drug enforcement, severity of punishment, and 
racial/ethnic discrimination in application of laws. Some 
manifestations of these policies have been particularly similar: The 
separation of immigrant children from their families at the U.S. 
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border,255 widely criticized both domestically256 and internationally,257 
was reverberated in the incarceration of African asylum seekers at 
Saharonim prison in the desert, a policy move which similarly 
provoked international critique.258 Similarly, the Trump 
Administration’s enthusiasm for the death penalty for drug dealers,259 
even as the penalty is in its final throes,260 is echoed by legislative 
efforts in Israel to make capital punishment a de-facto option261--with 
supporters in both countries making deterrence arguments. 
CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING ISRAEL’S FASCINATION WITH AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
How can the similarity between the two countries, particularly 
through the lens of political development, explain the impact of 
American criminal justice on Israeli policy? In Lesson-Drawing in Public 
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Policy,262 Richard Rose explains that importing policies and ideas is a 
politically contested process, in which the choice who to learn from 
depends upon a subjective definition of proximity, epistemic 
communities linking experts together, functional interdependence 
between governments, and the authority of intergovernmental 
institutions.263 Because this is a subjective and contested process, what 
Israeli policymakers see in the United States varies both generationally 
and across partisan lines. While in the early 1980s, as a country recently 
liberated from the legal shackles of British precedent, the U.S. example 
might have been appealing as a former British colony, and in the early 
1990s, as a beacon of civil rights (at least on paper); in the late 1990s 
and 2000s U.S. public policy offers a glance in the mirror and the 
recognition of an older sibling, complete with virtues and warts not 
dissimilar from the Israeli ones. 
The emergence of academic and legal elites in Israel that have 
been educated to critique (and often fault) the U.S. model is crucial. As 
Rose explains in Lesson Drawing, a crucial part of importing policies 
across borders is an assessment of their implementation in their home 
country—even before making the necessary cultural adjustments to 
the new policy climate.264 That this assessment has become less 
glowing in the last decade and a half is a triumph of the critical work 
of legal and socio-legal scholars in the United States, whose critique 
resonated with their Israeli students and colleagues. In that respect, the 
era of contention can be explained in two ways: the legacy of American 
mass incarceration finally coming home to roost in international public 
opinion, and the maturation of Israeli criminal justice policy into a 
psychological rejection of the American “parental” authority. 
It is imperative to encourage policymakers, legislators, and 
litigators in Israel to view future developments in the United States 
with a careful critical eye especially now, as human rights advocates 
set out to fight the Netanyahu regime’s Trumpian tendencies to make 
criminal law an instrument for disenfranchising, delegitimizing, and 
oppressing an increasing number of social sectors. While a change in 
both countries cannot come too soon, if reform is delayed in the United 
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States, Israeli criminal justice must vocally and clearly indicate its 
independence. 
 
